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PAYING THE IRS WHISTLEBLOWER:  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED PROCEEDS 
 
Karie Davis-Nozemack* 
Sarah Webber* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Congressional changes to the IRS Whistleblower Program were 
intended to induce more participation in the program by allowing larger 
incentives and greater certainty that whistleblowers would be paid.  Since 
the Program was amended, tax whistleblower tips have increased 76 
percent1 and revenue collected due to whistleblowers has increased 79 
percent.2  Despite a rise in tips and revenue collected, whistleblower 
payments have not increased.  In fact, the number of tax whistleblower 
awards paid has decreased 44 percent.3  We hypothesize that this trend is 
due to the administration of the program but also to the interpretation of 
“collected proceeds.”  Collected proceeds are tax revenues collected due to 
a specific whistleblower tip and comprise the pool of money from which a 
tax whistleblower award is made.  While scholarship exists examining the 
Whistleblower Program amendments and their effects, no scholar has 
critically examined the crux of the Whistleblower Program: what should 
constitute collected proceeds.   
 
This article offers critical analysis of both the Service’s interpretation of 
“collected proceeds” as well as proposals advanced by whistleblower 
advocates.  Neither the IRS nor the whistleblower advocates’ interpretations 
offer a properly inclusive view of collected proceeds.4  We suggest an 
                                                
* Karie Davis-Nozemack is an Assistant Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology’s 
College of Management; J.D., M.Tx.  The authors would like to thank the 2012 Huber 
Hurst Research Symposium and its hosts, the University of Florida’s Warrington College 
of Business and its business law faculty, for inviting us to present our work and for the 
invaluable feedback that the Hurst’s participants and discussants generously offered us.   
* Sarah Webber is an Assistant Professor, University of Dayton School of Business 
Administration; C.P.A., M.B.A., J.D., L.L.M. 
1 See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
USE OF SECTION 7623, at 16 (2010), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/annual_report_to_congress_fy_2010.pdf (tips 
increased from 4295 in 2006 to 7577 in 2010). 
2 Id. (revenue collected increased from $258 million in 2006 to $464 million in 2010). 
3 Id. (awards paid decreased from $24 million in 2006 to $28 million in 2010).  
4 Generally, the IRS has emphasized an overly narrow interpretation of collected 
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alternative view of collected proceeds that balances the need for an 
attainable incentive,5 administrable program,6 and federal revenue 
protection.7  Failing to achieve any one of these needs risks the 
Whistleblower Program’s viability.  We suggest a view of collected 
proceeds that builds upon the Program’s successes and broadens its scope, 
which should lead to increased federal revenue.     
 
Part One of this paper discusses the statutory changes to the 
Whistleblower Program, including the public policy behind the amendment 
as well as the manner in which the new IRS Whistleblower Office has 
administered the law.8  Part Two examines the Service’s interpretation of 
the basis of whistleblower payments,9 the “proceeds of amounts collected 
by reason of the information provided.”10  This Part uses the prior and 
current IRS payment policy, statutory interpretation, the 2012 Final 
Treasury Regulation, as well as conflicts between Service guidance and the 
Internal Revenue Manual to conclude that the Service’s interpretation of 
“collected proceeds” is not sufficiently inclusive.11  Part Three uses similar 
critical analysis to view the whistleblower advocates’ proposed 
                                                                                                                       
proceeds, while whistleblower advocates have argued for an interpretation that is overly 
inclusive and ignores the need for collection of funds prior to whistleblower compensation.  
This paper analyzes these interpretations and the underlying interests to create a view of 
collected proceeds that follows the statutory language but also addresses the interests of 
whistleblowers and the IRS Whistleblower Program.   
5 See Marsh J. Ferziger and Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics 
and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1143, 
1151-3, 1171-87 (1999) (discussing an enforcement-optimized bounty program under an 
economic model and stating “The potential informant’s expected bounty payment may be 
the single most important factor in ensuring optimal disclosures.”). 
6 Id. at 1158-60 (“Whether a bounty scheme is profitable overall depends partly upon 
the administrative costs of separating the meritorious from the nonmeritorious claims.  The 
IRS must sort through nearly ten thousand award claims every years, evaluating the merits 
both of the offered information and the claim for reward.”).  We also believe that the 
complexity of the administrative structure also factors into the Program’s possible success.   
7 See Kneave Riggall, Should Tax Informants be Paid?  The Law and Economics of a 
Government Monopsony, 28 VA. TAX REV. 237, 251 (2008) (“neoclassical economic 
theory predicts that if the Service rewards tax informants, it would receive more tips, more 
tax cheats would be “outed,” and tax revenues would increase.”).  See also Ferziger & 
Currell, supra note 5 at 1156 (“Payments out of proceeds, although introducing 
uncertainty, remains the best procedure for most agencies.  Without this option, it is 
difficult to ensure a revenue-positive operation of the bounty programs.”).  
8 See infra text accompanying notes 15-78.  
9 See infra text accompanying notes 81-152.  
10 § 7623(a).  The language of § 7623(b) differs slightly. See infra text accompanying 
notes 99-106 (discussing of the difference and its ramifications). 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 81-152. 
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interpretation of “collected proceeds” and finds that it ignores the tax 
realities of many alleged underpayments.12  Part Three concludes that the 
whistleblower advocates’ proposals for collected proceeds are overly 
inclusive.13  Finally, in Part Four, the paper considers a more balanced 
approach to defining “collected proceeds.”14     
 
I.  HISTORY OF THE IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 
 
The IRS Whistleblower Program has successfully utilized a cost-
effective method to recover tax revenues and close the tax gap.15  While the 
Program recovered $1.2 billion dollars between 2006 and 2010,16 the 
Whistleblower Program needs further improvement to sustain and build 
upon its success.  This Part introduces the Whistleblower Program by 
discussing the types of individuals involved in tax whistleblower claims,17 
followed by the legislative history of the whistleblower statute18 and 
administrative difficulties identified in the Whistleblower Program.19  
Finally, this Part discusses improvements for the Program’s 
administration,20 and concludes that, while administrative improvements are 
needed, the most pressing need lies in clarifying “collected proceeds.”   
 
A.  Who is the Whistleblower? 
 
The connotations associated with the whistleblower term vary 
significantly.  There are those who view the whistleblower as a “hero” or 
champion protecting honest taxpayers and the tax system.21  Whistleblower 
advocates point out that there is a huge cost to a whistleblower in coming 
forward.22   A whistleblower providing information on tax fraud or 
                                                
12 See infra text accompanying notes 153-277.  
13 See generally infra text accompanying notes 153-277.  
14 See infra text accompanying notes 278-314.  
15 Tom Herman, Tipster Rewards Require Patience, WALL STREET J. Dec. 26, 2007, at 
D3.  See also Edward Morse, Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside 
Information to Close the “Tax Gap,” 24 AKRON TAX J. 1, 11-13 (2009). 
16 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 16 (stating proceeds 
derived from whistleblower tips 2006-2010). 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 21-33.   
18 See infra text accompanying notes 34-55.   
19 See infra text accompanying notes 56-80.   
20 See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.   
21 See Letter from Senator Charles Grassley, U.S. Senate, to Douglas Shulman, 
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv., at 8, Sept. 13, 2011, available at 
http://www.rewardtax.com/files/grassleylettertoshulman9_13_11.pdf.  
22 See Internal Revenue Serv., Public Hearing on Proposed Regulation 26 C.F.R. Part 
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improper return positions faces risks, such as “loss of job, loss of reputation, 
loss of career.”23  
 
Others take a different, and perhaps a much more negative view of 
whistleblowers.  A whistleblower often faces the particularly distasteful 
distinction of being a “snitch.”24  In Senate debate of the 1998 Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, Senator Reid suggested 
eliminating the IRS Whistleblower Program because a program that rewards 
individuals who turn in co-workers, family members and other parties is 
“just wrong”.25  Indeed, the Service itself previously treated tax 
whistleblowers as “skunks at a picnic.”26  The Service has diligently worked 
to change both its perspective and treatment of whistleblowers. 
The whistleblower may be best viewed as a reluctant participant who 
simply does not what to participate anymore.  It could be that the 
whistleblower has become fed up with the other participants or may be 
persuaded to act based on an incentive from the IRS Whistleblower 
Program.   As eloquently stated in a comment letter, “promoters of tax 
shelters and tax fraud are not surrounded by boy scouts and 
angels.”27  Rather, “whistleblowers will often not have clean hands.”28  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Service often receives tips after a 
relationship has gone bad, be it a familial, romantic, or business 
relationship.  It is this type of intimate relationship that often provides for 
the “detailed inside knowledge that will be the most beneficial in bring 
forward tax fraud.”29 The repercussions of whistleblowing can vastly 
disrupt or change a whistleblower’s employment and relationships with co-
workers, friends or even family members; however, oftentimes these 
relationships were already in jeopardy of turning sour. 
                                                                                                                       
301, “Rewards and Awards for Information Relating to Violations of Internal Revenue 
Laws,” at 13, May 11, 2011, available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc. 2011-10193 (comments 
of Richard Rubin). 
23 See Hearing Transcript, supra note 22 at 2 (comments of Linda Stengle).  
24 144 CONG. REC. S4379-05, at S4397-98 (Statement of Sen. Reid). 
25 Id. 
26 See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 1. 
27 See Letter from Jesselyn Radack, Marsha Coleman-Adebayo, Gina Green to 
Douglas Shulman, Internal Revenue Serv., Commissioner (Aug. 10, 2011) (expressing 
concern I.R.M. factors for reducing a whistleblower award for whistleblowers who planned 
and initiated an action), available at 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=3693
6. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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 Regardless of the positive or negative view of the whistleblower, it 
cannot be disputed that the Whistleblower Program has been a successful 
way for the Service to promote federal revenue protection.30  Arguably the 
Program has been one the most successful, in terms of tax revenues 
recovered versus cost of administering the program.31   The payment system 
for rewarding whistleblowers is discussed in detail below including its 
evolution32 and the most recent changes to payments.33   
B.  Early Incentives for Tax Whistleblowers 
 
While the IRS Whistleblower Office is new, the idea of rewarding an 
individual who turns in a party who intentionally misuses the Code or 
misfiles taxes was authorized by statute in 1867.  The original law provided 
the Secretary with the authority to pay awards necessary for detecting and 
punishing persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or scheming 
to do so.34  The earliest versions of tax whistleblower awards did not 
provide much incentive for whistleblowers and were underutilized by the 
Service to attract informants.35  This could be attributed to the uncertainty 
regarding payment amounts.  Under the 1954 codification of § 7623, the 
Secretary was given the discretion to determine award payments,36 and this 
discretion was upheld in numerous court opinions regarding both the 
decision whether to pay an award and the proper award amount.37 
                                                
30 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 16 (stating proceeds 
derived from whistleblower tips 2006-2010).  
31 Id.  See also Morse, supra note 15, at 11-13. 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 34-55, 81-152.  
33 See infra text accompanying notes 153-314. 
34 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra  note 1 at 4 (citing Act of 
Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified by Ch. 11, § 3463, 35 Rev. Stat. 686 
(1873-74) (codified as § 7623 (1954)).  See also Morse, supra note 15 at 11-13. 
35 See Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower Program 
Thanks to the IRS Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447, 451 (Winter 2010) 
(citing Dennis J. Ventry, Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 363-64 
(Winter 2008) (concluding that the law that was in effect before December 2006 had 
“paltry bounties, stingy administrators, inadequate protection for whistleblowers, and 
unreceptive courts”)). 
36 § 7623. 
37 See Kwon, supra note 35 at 453-455 (“While few whistleblowers filed suit to 
challenge their award determinations, those who did had little success. . . . [T]he Service 
won every one of the nineteen cases that whistleblowers filed to challenge awards from 
1941 to 1998).  See McGrath v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 978 (Ct. Cl. 1975) and Saracena 
v. United States, 508 F.2d 1333, 1334-36 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (finding the Service had “complete 
discretion in the first instance to determine whether an award should be made and, in the 
second instance, to fix what, in [its] judgment, amounts to adequate compensation”). These 
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Whistleblower payments were originally paid out of appropriated funds; 
however, this payment system was revised in 1996 to use collected 
proceeds for payments.38  This was a significant shift for the Whistleblower 
Program that forced the Whistleblower Program to have additional 
accountability for achieving its goal of revenue protection.  The Program 
would need to find the proper incentives that would attract whistleblowers 
while still generating the maximum revenue increases.  This fine-tuning of 
proper incentives can be seen in the subsequent modifications to § 7623 and 
continues in the changes to the corresponding Regulation.   
 
The original § 7623 Regulation provided for the discretionary payment 
of a minimum of one percent of the collected proceeds and a maximum of 
fifteen percent of the collected proceeds, depending on the type of 
information received. 39 The original Regulation also capped the maximum 
payment to a whistleblower at $10 million dollars.40  Publication 733 lists 
the payment schedule as: 
 
Information Type Percentage of 
Collected Proceeds 
Awarded 
Maximum Recovery 
General Information with No 
Direct Relationship to the 
Determination of Tax 
Liabilities  
1 Percent $10 Million 
Information of value in the 
determination of tax 
liabilities although not 
specific  
10 Percent $10 Million 
                                                                                                                       
opinions were relied upon in subsequent decisions upholding the discretionary nature of the 
IRS Whistleblower award.  See Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); Carelli v. IRS, 668 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 1982); Destefano v. United States, 52 
Fed. Cl. 291, 293 (2002) and Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
38 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, ß 1209(a), 110 Stat.1473 (1996) 
(amending § 7623(a.)). 
39 Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (as amended in 1998) (“The amount of a reward will 
represent what the district or service center director deems to be adequate compensation in 
the particular case, generally not to exceed fifteen percent of the amounts (other than 
interest) collected by reason of the information.”). 
40 Id. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 733, REWARDS FOR 
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct. 
2004), available at http://www.unclefed.com/IRS-Forms/2005/p733.pdf and I.R.M. 
25.2.2.5 (as amended Apr. 27, 1999). 
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Information causing 
investigation or materially 
assisted in the development 
of an issue resulting in a 
recovery 
15 Percent $10 Million 
 
While the Regulation and Publication 733 offered some guidance for 
payment percentages and maximum award recoveries, there was still much 
uncertainty in determining a potential whistleblower’s award. 
 
C.  2006 Code Changes and the Whistleblower Office Established 
 
In response to Congress’s request for review of the Whistleblower 
Program, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
(“TIGTA”) audited the Program in June 2006. The TIGTA audit showed 
significant economic success for the IRS Informants’ Rewards Program,41 
despite several shortcomings in the Program’s oversight and management.42 
The Program generated significant revenue but could potentially generate 
more.43  The TIGTA report also highlighted the problem with the current 
percentage payout award structure (the 1, 10 and 15 percent structure)44 and 
discretionary nature of payments.  The TIGTA report signaled an 
underutilized Program that was fraught with administrative problems as 
well as a lack of a clearly defined incentive for potential whistleblowers.  
The TIGTA report served as a springboard to push legislation forward that 
could help strengthen the Whistleblower Program.  Senator Charles 
Grassley, the champion of the IRS Whistleblower Program and author of 
the 2006 reforms, persuaded Congress to significantly overhaul the 
                                                
41 The IRS Informants’ Rewards Program was renamed as the IRS Whistleblowers 
Program following the 2006 § 7623 amendments. 
42 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., The Informants' Reward Program 
Needs More Centralized Management Oversight (June 2006), available at: 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630092fr.html. The TIGTA 
report cites an internal Service study that it only cost the Treasury four cents for every 
dollar collected under the Whistleblower Program in comparison to ten cents per dollar 
collected for all other enforcement programs. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., The 
Informants’ Project: A Study of the Present Law Reward Program (Sept.1999).   
43 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 4 (noting that the 
Whistleblower Program collected $258 million in fiscal year 2006).  
44 See TIGTA Audit 2006, supra note 42 (“We were unable to determine the 
justification for the reward percentage awarded to the informant in 32 percent of the cases.”  
Regarding rejected claims, the statistics were more startling.  “We were unable to 
determine the rationale for the reviewer’s decision to reject the claim in 76 percent of the 
cases reviewed.”). 
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Whistleblower Program following the TIGTA report.   
 
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 200645 greatly enhanced the 
Whistleblower Program46 and created an additional subsection to the 
whistleblower Code provision, § 7623(b).  Section 7623(b) applies in 
situations where the “tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional 
amounts in dispute exceed $ 2,000,000.”47  When the tax dispute involves 
an individual taxpayer instead of a business, the individual’s annual gross 
income must exceed $200,000.48  By adjusting the award to target high 
dollar tax abuses, Congress intended to use the Whistleblower Program as a 
way to get the maximum return in relation to the cost of the program. 
“Congress hope[d] the lure of much bigger rewards w[ould] prompt more 
informants to offer better tips and help the IRS reduce the nation's $290 
billion tax gap, the difference between what the agency collects each year 
and what it thinks it should be collecting.”49  Section 7623(b) also modified 
the payment structure for whistleblowers.  The maximum payment caps 
were removed for § 7623(b) awards.  Whistleblowers are now entitled to 
“receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the 
collected proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and 
additional amounts) resulting from the action (including any related actions) 
or from any settlement in response to such action.”50  The new Code 
provision also acknowledged that the whistleblower may not have clean 
hands when blowing the whistle.  An award is payable so long as the 
whistleblower was not convicted of a crime for his or her involvement in 
the tax underpayment.51 
                                                
45 See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, § 406(a)(1)(D), 120 
Stat. 2922 (2006), codified at § 7623(b) et seq. 
46 The 2006 Act established the Whistleblower Office as a separate office within the 
IRS. See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 5 (“Operating at the 
direction of the Commissioner of the IRS, the Whistleblower Office coordinates with other 
divisions of the IRS, analyzes information submitted, and makes award determinations.”). 
Although permitted under statute, the Whistleblower Office does not currently investigate 
whistleblower claims.  Rather, the Whistleblower Office assigns investigation of a 
whistleblower claim to the appropriate Service office to initial investigation.   
47 See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, supra note 45, codified at § 
7623(b)(5)(B). 
48 § 7623(b)(5)(A). 
49 See Herman, supra note 15.  See also Morse, supra note 15 at 3-4 (noting that the 
incentives provided under the 2006 changes to the whistleblower program “may indeed 
enhance enforcement effectiveness, but collateral impacts on other social values, including 
privacy and fidelity in professional relationships, also deserve consideration.”).   
50 § 7623(b)(1). 
51 § 7623(b)(3). 
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The 2006 changes to the Whistleblower Program greatly increased the 
value of awards available to the whistleblower, but also provided some 
degree of certainty that was not present under the previous discretionary 
payment system still codified in § 7623(a).52   Further, the 2006 changes to 
the Program have led to more high quality submissions to the Service.53  
Despite this positive response, there remains much uncertainty in the actual 
payment process, especially as it relates to the terms “proceeds of amounts 
collected” and “collected proceeds” used within § 7623.  Although the 2006 
amendments offered greater predictability for award payments, 
whistleblowers still face uncertainty when calculating the total award 
payment.  It is unclear what are proceeds and when they are collected.  
Assuming a whistleblower brought forth credible and helpful information 
that would generally warrant a thirty percent award, the whistleblower’s 
next obstacle was to determine the basis on which to calculate thirty 
percent.  Determining the total award payment has baffled whistleblowers 
and their attorneys because collected proceeds has not been adequately 
defined.54  In subsequent years, the Service has attempted to remedy this 
problem by issuing additional guidance; however, numerous unanswered 
questions remain.55   
 
D.  Administrative Challenges for the IRS Whistleblower Program  
 
Following the 2006 amendments, the IRS received over forty new 
claims within a two and one-half month period under the new § 7623(b) 
provisions.56 IRS Whistleblower Office Director Stephen Whitlock stated 
that although there were variations in the quality of the claims submitted, 
the Service received “some very good claims with good support and very 
                                                
52 § 7623(a) permitted the payout of awards based on collected proceeds that are 
deemed sums necessary.   
53 Letter from Scott Knott and Gregory Lyman, Ferraro Law Firm, to Kristen Witter, 
Internal Revenue Service at 4 (Apr. 18, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-
8482  (commenting on the value of awards).  
54 This problem is compounded by the fact that the Whistleblower Office does not 
remain in contact with the whistleblower once the whistleblower claim is submitted until 
final payment.  This has been a source of frustration for whistleblowers.  The Service had 
remained firm in limiting its contact with the whistleblower, but recently softened this 
approach by issuing a regulation, effective March 15, 2011, allowing for confidential 
disclosure to the whistleblower or the whistleblower’s legal representative regarding the 
status of the whistleblower’s claim when the whistleblower has entered into a written 
contract with the Service.  See Treas. Reg. §301.6103(n)-2. 
55 See infra text accompanying notes 81-277 for a discussion of open issues. 
56 See Herman, supra note 15. 
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promising leads.”57  The Service needs a great deal of time to build a 
whistleblower case and examine the underlying tax return.  In 2007, 
Whistleblower Attorney Scott Knott suggested that the payment timeline for 
whistleblower claims would likely run between four and seven years before 
the whistleblower received any compensation.58  The lengthy payment 
process remains a primary complaint of whistleblowers and their advocates.  
This timing issue has been cited as a serious concern in the administration 
of the Whistleblower Program.59  However, some have also recognized the 
lengthy delay as a necessary component of the payout process:60  “The IRS 
has been unfairly criticized for not paying any awards to date under [§] 
7623 as amended in 2006 given the (i) time required to review the alleged 
claim, examine the alleged tax violator, settle the proposed adjustments 
through the appeals and/or judicial process and, finally, for the 
Whistleblower Office to review the case file and process the award.”61 
 
After the 2006 TIGTA audit of the IRS Whistleblower Program, TIGTA 
conducted a follow-up audit in 2009. The 2009 TIGTA Audit showed that 
there are still many aspects that could be improved in the Whistleblower 
Program.62 At the time of the audit, the IRS Whistleblower Office was 
implementing a single inventory control system and TIGTA recommended 
performing physical reconciliations of claims to ensure all information was 
captured in the new system.63  TIGTA also expressed concern over the 
tracking of claims to ensure timely processing.64  The IRS responded 
favorably to all of the recommendations and has implemented additional 
quality checks based on TIGTA’s report, yet the timeliness of administering 
the Program continues to be a concern.65 
 
In its fiscal year 2010 report, the Whistleblower Office reported the 
number of claims submitted, number of awards paid and the dollar amount 
of the total awards paid.  Based on the initial 2007 submissions, the Service 
                                                
57 Id. 
58 Id. (quoting Attorney Scott Knott). 
59 See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 1 (referring to a concern over the long 
timeframes for processing claims). 
60 Letter from Anonymous Taxpayer to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Serv., at 1 
(Mar. 23, 2011) (commenting on Prop.  Reg. § 301.7623-1). 
61 Id. 
62  TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN FOR TAX ADMIN., 2009-30-114, DEFICIENCIES EXIST IN 
THE CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS, 3 (Aug. 20, 2009). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 21.  
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saw a significant increase in submission of § 7623(b) whistleblower claims 
in 2008, 2009 and 2010; however, payments under § 7623(b) have yet to 
occur.66  These submission levels suggest that the Service has been effective 
in promoting the Whistleblower Program.  They also indicate that the 
revised incentive system under the 2006 statutory changes has been 
successful in attracting whistleblowers to come forward. 
 
§ 7623(B) SUBMISSIONS BY FISCAL YEAR67 
 
Year Number of Submissions Number of Taxpayers 
Identified 
2007 49 587 
2008 378 1366 
2009 470 2150 
2010 431 5429 
 
AMOUNTS COLLECTED AND AWARDS PAID UNDER § 7623(A) FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2006-201068 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Cases 
Received 
4295 2751 3704 5678 7577 
Awards 
Paid 
220 227 198 110 97 
Collections 
Over $2 
million 
N/A 12 8 5 9 
Total 
Amount of 
Awards 
Paid69 
$24,184,458 $13,600,205 $22,370,756 $5,851,608 $18,746,327 
Amounts 
Collected 
$258,590,435 $181,784,287 $155,985,834 $206,032,872 $464,695,459 
 
The data above does not present itself in perfect trends; however, a broad 
                                                
66 Prior to the release of the Whistleblower Office’s Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report, 
the press reported that one whistleblower payment under section § 7623(b) has been made.  
See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Pays First Enhanced Whistleblower Award, TAX NOTES DOC 
2011-7587 (Apr. 18, 2011). 
67 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 9. 
68 Id. at 16. 
69 The IRS paid all of the awards listed above, including those paid in 2010, based on 
the prior law, what is now § 7623(a). Therefore, the higher payout percentages from the 
2006 § 7623(b) changes do not apply to the awards in this chart.  Id. at 14. 
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view shows a sharp decline in the number of awards paid in 2009 and 2010, 
approximately half of the awards paid in the three previous years.70  In 
2010, with significantly fewer awards, record proceeds were collected: $464 
million.71  Greater submissions and revenue collected but fewer awards 
could be a dangerous trend for the Whistleblower Program and should be 
corrected in subsequent years.72  If potential whistleblowers believe there is 
little chance of receiving payment in a reasonable time or are concerned that 
an award may not come to fruition, the Service loses its ability to offer an 
effective incentive to attract submissions. 
 
    The Whistleblower Office notes several points about the data above.  
The first is that, “the number and amount of awards paid each year can vary 
significantly, especially when a small number of high-dollar claims are 
resolved in one year (as was the case in 2006 and 2008).”73  The other 
important consideration to note is that during 2009 the Service changed the 
point at which payment can be issued to the whistleblower, requiring a 
longer waiting time for the two-year refund request window to close.74  
 
Despite the failure to see any payments under § 7623(b) during the 2010 
fiscal year, the Service’s data indicates an overall increase in interest in the 
Whistleblower Program.75  Comparing 2006 to 2010, submissions have 
risen under both § 7623(a) and § 7623(b).  The data also indicates a concern 
about the effectiveness of the current incentive program for whistleblowers 
given the fact that claims are likely on the rise yet the number of payouts 
have not seen a correlative increase.   This award payment trend highlights 
the concern about the current administrable nature of the Program and 
whether the Service is effectively incentivizing whistleblowers.   
 
The most recent governmental analysis of the Whistleblower Program 
was a report released in September 2011 from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO).  The GAO expressed concern over the 
                                                
70 See supra text and charts accompanying notes 67-68.   
71 See supra text and chart accompanying note 68.  
72 The Service claims the trend is due solely to the time that it takes to resolve a 
whistleblower claim and the underlying taxpayer’s examination.  If this is the case, the only 
concern that the trend suggest is perception of delay by whistleblowers.  If, on the other 
hand, the mismatch of high whistleblower tips and high revenue but few whistleblower 
payments, then greater concern is warranted.  It is unclear which is to blame.  
73 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 14. 
74 Id.  
75 See supra text and charts accompanying notes 67-68 (showing increased § 7623(a) 
and (b) submission when comparing 2006 and 2010 submissions).  
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processing time for whistleblower claims.76  This concern echoes the data 
released months prior in the 2010 Annual Report to Congress.77  The GAO 
acknowledges that investigating a Whistleblower claim is an inherently long 
process, but recommended process implementation to track the timing of a 
submitted claim and monitor claims that lag behind time targets.78 While 
the Service acknowledges delay problems, it remains to be seen whether the 
GAO’s suggested changes will improve the system delays that have plagued 
the Whistleblower Program.  
 
 Based on the TIGTA audit, Whistleblower Office Annual Report, and 
GAO study, it appears that the Whistleblower Program has succeeded in 
identifying tax fraud, return misfilings and other abuses of the Code, but 
there are many areas in which the Program can be strengthened.  Adding 
certainty to the incentives offered to whistleblowers could greatly 
strengthen the Whistleblower Program.79  It is clear from the governmental 
studies conducted that the question of “when will payment occur?” has not 
been answered effectively through the Whistleblower Program.  This 
administrative downfall should be reviewed and closely monitored to ensure 
that improvements are being made.  In Part II, the Service’s interpretation 
of collected proceeds is examined including a review of the recent Treasury 
Regulation, § 301.7623-1.80  The Regulation has shed some light on the 
question of “how much” the whistleblower will be paid, but there are 
several deficiencies in the Service guidance to define “collected proceeds.”  
 
II. THE SERVICE’S INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTED PROCEEDS 
 
In spite of the dramatic revisions to the Whistleblower Office, neither 
the Code, Regulations, nor the Service’s internal guidance have provided a 
precise definition of “collected proceeds.”  The Service, however, has 
delineated what it believes is and is not collected proceeds in several 
forums, including the Regulations, Notices, Chief Counsel’s Program 
Manager Technical Advice Memoranda (PMTA), and orally via Service 
personnel at hearings.81  When read together the guidance fails to cover all 
                                                
76 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-683, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS: 
INCOMPLETE DATA HINDERS IRS’S ABILITY TO MANAGE CLAIM PROCESSING TIME AND 
ENHANCE EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION at 1 (Aug. 2011). 
77 Whistleblower Office FY 2010 Report, supra note 1. 
78 See GAO Report, supra note 76 at 1.  
79 See Ferziger and Currell, supra note 5 at 1197-1200 (discussing the importance of 
certainty in a bounty program). 
80 See infra text accompanying notes 81-152. 
81 See generally infra text accompanying notes 81-152. 
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possible scenarios and is inconsistent.  These shortcomings put the entire 
Whistleblower Program at risk.  The certainty of an incentive is a necessary 
component to attract potential whistleblowers to come forward with 
information.82  Current Service policies leave significant uncertainty 
regarding how timing,83 refunds,84 credit balances,85 and tax attributes86 
equate to collected proceeds.  This uncertainty also risks adding to the 
already lengthy administration process if a whistleblower appeals an award 
decision based on the Service’s inconsistent guidance.      
 
 Part II identifies and addresses questions and inconsistencies that result 
from the current Service interpretation of collected proceeds.  This Part 
begins by analyzing the significance of the 1996 amendments.87  The next 
Subpart discusses the current statutory language.88  The third Subpart 
reviews the evolution of the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM).89  The fourth 
and fifth Subparts analyze current Office of Chief Counsel guidance and the 
Regulation.90  The sixth and final Subpart highlights the inconsistencies and 
gaps in coverage in the current Service guidance on collected proceeds.91  
  
A. 1996 Amendments and Their Significance 
 
Despite a long-standing statutory presence, the IRS Whistleblower 
Program has only recently been significantly utilized.92  The increased use 
occurred after substantial improvements within the past fifteen years.93  
                                                
82 See Ferziger and Currell, supra note 5 at 1181-3 (discussing certainty and its effects 
on government bounty programs).    
83 See infra text accompanying notes 147-152, 270-277 (discussing timing issues).  
84 See infra text accompanying notes 127-135, 147-152 (discussing inclusion of refund 
denials in collected proceeds). 
85 See infra text accompanying notes 127-152, 208-222 (discussing the partial 
inclusion of credit balances in collected proceeds). 
86 See infra text accompanying notes 175-207 (discussing exclusion of tax attributes in 
collected proceeds).   
87 See infra text accompanying notes 165-174 (discussing prior versions of § 7623).  
88 See infra text accompanying notes 175-207 (discussing the current § 7623 and 
collected proceeds).  
89 See infra text accompanying notes 208-222 (discussing collected proceeds in the 
context of the I.R.M.). 
90 See infra text accompanying notes 127-146 (discussing Chief Counsel guidance and 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1).  
91 See infra text accompanying notes 147-152 (discussing inconsistencies). 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 34-55 (discussing the history of the 
Whistleblower Program).    
93 See supra text accompanying notes 34-55 (discussing the 1996 and 2006 
amendments to § 7623 and their effect on the Whistleblower Program).    
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These improvements were intended to clarify and strengthen the Program 
but that has not always been the result.94  Imprecise drafting, inconsistent 
sources of authority, and undefined terms still plague determinations of 
whistleblower awards.95  In 1996, Congress changed the pool of funds that 
compensate a whistleblower from the Service budget to “proceeds of 
amounts collected.”96  This change marks the beginning of the struggle to 
delineate the sums that should comprise collected proceeds.  The 1996 
amendments also added the phrase “for detecting underpayments of tax” to 
§ 7623.97  While a whistleblower award could still be made for broad 
violations of the tax laws, these amendments (adding “for detecting 
underpayments of tax” and payments made from “proceeds of collected 
amounts”) focused the Whistleblower Program toward maximizing revenue, 
not merely catching violators.  The 1996 amendments led to a revision of 
the associated Regulation, § 301.7623-1, to clarify that whistleblower 
rewards were available where the information led to a denial of a refund, 
not merely an affirmative recovery of taxes owed.98  The Regulation’s focus 
on revenue protection, in terms of uncollected taxes as well as improper 
refunds, was entirely consistent with the focus of the 1996 amendments.  
This represented a significant change in the Service’s whistleblower policy 
to reward information that produces additional federal revenues as a result 
                                                
94 See infra text accompanying notes 136-147 (discussing the inconsistencies and 
questions from recent Service guidance) 
95 Id. 
96 IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FISCAL YEAR 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE 
OF SECTION 7623 at 1-2, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/whistleblowerfy09rtc.pdf.  See also § 7623, Pub. L. 104-168 (1996 amendments).  
97 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., History of Whistleblower/Informant Program, available 
at http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0,,id=181294,00.html.  See also Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights 2, Pub. Law 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).  Prior to the amendment, § 7623 
stated, “The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is authorized to pay 
such sums, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum appropriated therefore, as he may deem 
necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the 
internal revenue laws, or conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not 
otherwise provided for by law.” 
98 TREASURY DECISION 8770, REWARDS FOR INFORMATION RELATING TO 
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS, ADOPTING FINAL REGULATION 
(explanation of provision).  See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (amended Aug. 21, 
1998) (“The rewards provided for by section 7623 and this section will be paid from 
the proceeds of amounts (other than interest) collected by reason of the information 
provided.  For purposes of section 7623 and this section, proceeds of amounts (other 
than interest) collected by reason of the information provided include both additional 
amounts collected because of the information provided and amounts collected prior to 
receipt of the information if the information leads to the denial of a claim for refund 
that otherwise would have been paid.  
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of the whistleblower’s information.   
 
B. Statutory Interpretation of Collected Proceeds 
 
Following the Congressional changes in 2006 to the whistleblower 
statutes, there are currently two systems under which a whistleblower may 
be paid.  The first is under § 7623(a), and the second is under the newer § 
7623(b).  Under subsection (a), the Service has discretion to pay a 
whistleblower “from the proceeds of amounts collected by reason of the 
information provided, and any amount so collected shall be available for 
such payments.”99  Subsection (b)(1) provides for paying whistleblowers 
“an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the collected 
proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional 
amounts) resulting from the action . . . or from any settlement in response to 
such action.”100   
 
There are two distinctions here.  First, the Service has the statutory 
discretion with regard to award payment under § 7623(a),101 whereas 
awards meeting the criteria of § 7623(b) are mandated.102  The Service has 
no discretion in whether to make an award under § 7623(b), so long as the 
statutory criteria are met.  The second and far less critical difference is in 
the language used: § 7623(a) and (b) use different language (proceeds of 
amounts collected vs. collected proceeds) for the pool of money from which 
to pay awards.  The Service has stated that “[w]hile the language of section 
7623 differs slightly between subsections (a) and (b), [the Service does] not 
think the difference is meaningful and therefore the legal analysis  . . . 
should be the same for subsections (a) and (b).103  The Service’s 
interpretation that the term “collected proceeds” applies under both 
subsections (a) and (b) is consistent with legislative history104 and 
subsequent Congressional statements.105  It appears the change in 
                                                
99 § 7623(a) (emphasis added). 
100 § 7623(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
101 § 7623(a) (“The Secretary  . . . is authorized to p[ay such sums as he seems 
necessary . . .). 
102 § 7623(b)(1) (“ . . . such individual shall receive as an award . . .”).  
103 Program Manager Technical Assistance, PMTA 2010-62 (Sept. 1, 2010) (analyzing 
the payment of refund protection and credit reduction claims under § 7623). 
104 Little legislative history is available for the 2006 amendments. This is likely 
because the Whistleblower amendments were only a small, an uncontroversial part of the 
much larger Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, enacted on December 20, 2006. 
105 See Press Release from Senator Check Grassley (Sept. 9, 2011) (identifying self as 
the author of the 2006 amendments and urging the Service to working more closely with 
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terminology is nothing more than word economy, resulting in the same 
definitional analysis for both § 7623(a) and (b).106 
 
C. Evolution of the Internal Revenue Manual 
 
The Service’s whistleblower award policies have evolved over the last 
fifteen years.  The evolution is particularly evident when viewing the three 
most recent versions of the Internal Revenue Manual (I.R.M.), which is a 
compilation of the Service’s policies and procedures, including those 
relevant to whistleblower claims.107  Because Service personnel use the 
I.R.M. as a daily procedure guides, changes to the I.R.M. whistleblower 
provisions can be viewed as manifestations of the Service’s changing 
whistleblower policies.   
 
 The 1999 I.R.M., which was in force for the whistleblower provisions 
through 2008, never defined collected proceeds.  In fact, the 1999 I.R.M.  
used other terms synonymously with collected proceeds.108  This, of course, 
did not advance understanding of collected proceeds.  Under the 1999 
I.R.M., collected proceeds did not appear to be a term of art.  Under the 
1999 I.R.M., the Service included all criminal fines in collected proceeds.109 
This policy was subsequently changed in the next version.  The 1999 I.R.M. 
further contemplated that the Service would net collected proceeds, within a 
tax year and among tax years lengthening the payout process for 
whistleblowers.110  The 1999 I.R.M. also required the closing of all tax 
                                                                                                                       
whistleblowers and their attorneys). 
106 The authors have seen no variation in the synonymous interpretation of “proceeds 
of amounts collected” and “collected proceeds” from either the Service or the 
whistleblower advocates.  All references throughout this paper to collected proceeds 
presume to apply to both subsections (a) and (b). 
107 MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2nd ed., at 3-126 (2002) 
(discussing the Internal Revenue Manual).  
108 I.R.M. 25.2.2.5(1)(a), (b), and (c), Allowance Computation (04-27-1999) (using the 
term “amounts recovered”). 
109 I.R.M. 25.2.2.13(a)(1), Partial Allowances (04-27-1999) (“A reward should not be 
paid with respect to a particular tax year until the deficiency (tax, penalties, and fines) has 
been paid in full for that specific tax year. However, a partial reward may be paid if, for 
example, it can be ascertained in a criminal prosecution case that the conviction was 
directly or indirectly attributable to the informant’s information. A reward allowance 
based on the fine when paid may be made as a partial allowance prior to the civil 
settlement of the tax liability.”) (emphasis added). 
110 I.R.M. 25.2.2.12, Offsetting Adjustments (04-27-1999) (“(1) In determining 
whether a reward should be allowed and, if so, the amount thereof, consideration should be 
given to adjustments for one year which will result in potential tax savings to the taxpayer 
for subsequent years or to another taxpayer for any year. (a) For example, if the closing 
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years before payment could be made, with limited exceptions in areas like a 
criminal prosecution and when a tax year’s deficiency had been paid in 
full.111 These policies required an overly broad interpretation of finality 
raising a concern that a whistleblower may not receive payments for an 
extended period of time.  
 
The Service has twice amended the Internal Revenue Manual’s 
whistleblower section following the 2006 statutory changes to § 7623.112  
The first I.R.M. amendment was published in December 2008,113 and the 
second I.R.M. amendment was published in June 2010.114  The 2008 I.R.M. 
amendment overhauled nearly almost every provision in the I.R.M. 
whistleblower section.  It created new procedures for the two systems of 
cases and processes for administering claims.115  In addition, the I.R.M. 
addressed the need to delay payment until appeals in the underlying case 
had resolved,116 which was not necessarily contemplated in the prior I.R.M. 
version.117   Despite these helpful clarifications, problems with the 2008 
                                                                                                                       
inventory for one year is increased, resulting in an increase in income for that year, the 
opening inventory for the next succeeding year will be correspondingly increased, resulting 
in a decrease in income for that year. The deficiency for the first year is offset by the 
corresponding decrease in income for the subsequent year, usually resulting in no net tax 
recovery. . . . (c) Information may be furnished and claim for reward filed with respect to 
the returns of one taxpayer for several years. If one of the years is closed with assessment 
and payment of a deficiency, but the other years are still under examination, no reward 
should be granted for the closed year until examination of all years has been completed. 
This is true since adjustments made to the returns for the open years may result in 
offsetting adjustments, no reward should be allowed until the overall results of the 
information furnished may be evaluated.”). 
111 I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(c), Offsetting Adjustments (04-27-1999).  See also I.R.M. 
25.2.2.13(1), Partial Allowances (04-27-1999) (“(1) Partial allowance of a reward claim 
should be made where feasible. (a) A reward should not be paid with respect to a particular 
tax year until the deficiency (tax, penalties, and fines) has been paid in full for that specific 
tax year. However, a partial reward may be paid if, for example, it can be ascertained in a 
criminal prosecution case that the conviction was directly or indirectly attributable to the 
informant’s information. A reward allowance based on the fine when paid may be made as 
a partial allowance prior to the civil settlement of the tax liability.”). 
112 I.R.M. 25.2.2 et seq. 
113 I.R.M. 25.2.2 et seq. (12-30-2008). 
114 I.R.M. 25.2.2 et seq. (06-18-2010). 
115 I.R.M. 25.2.2 et seq. (12-30-2008). 
116 I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(5), Overview: Authority & Policy (12-30-2008) (stating “the 
requirement that claims be paid from collected proceeds generally means that payment 
cannot be made for several years after the information is submitted, because the underlying 
taxpayer’s case (including any appeals) must be resolved.”). 
117 I.R.M. 25.2.2.9, Repayment of reward in Certain Cases (04-27-1999) 
(contemplating circumstances and procedures for whistleblowers repaying awards if the 
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version of the I.R.M. whistleblower section remained.  It was unclear on 
what basis the thresholds in (b) would be measured.  Would they be 
measured on the allegations in the tip or on the proceeds collected?  What if 
the Service settled the matter or allowed an offer in compromise for less 
than the determined deficiency?  It was also unclear as to when an 
underlying tax case was “resolved” and collected proceeds could be 
ascertained.    
In the most recent I.R.M. whistleblower provisions, adopted in 2010 
only eighteen months after the prior version, the Service clarified a number 
of provisions but failed to resolve issues with others.  For example, the 2010 
I.R.M. added significant clarity regarding the requirement of finality before 
payment,118 specificity in processing 7632(a) and (b) claims,119 defining a 
related action for tips that lead to mushrooming of taxpayers, tax years, or 
issues,120 the whistleblower administrative proceeding,121 and factors in 
award computation.122   
 
Unfortunately, the 2010 I.R.M. still has not offered clarity for 
determining how to calculate whether a tip will be paid under §7623(a) or 
(b).  The I.R.M. now states that the Service will use “the best information 
available” to determine the amount in dispute in determining “ground for 
not processing claims for award.”123  The 2010 I.R.M. also fails to address 
how a compromise of a deficiency by the Service will affect the calculation 
of collected proceeds.  More importantly, despite including statements 
regarding finality and calculation of collected proceeds,124 the Service’s 
only clear guidance was that it will wait until the two-year refund period 
                                                                                                                       
collected proceeds were reduced.). 
118 I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010). 
119 I.R.M. 25.2.2.6, Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (06-18-
2010) and 25.2.2.7, Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award (06-18-2010).  
120 I.R.M. 25.2.2.2(8), General (06-18-2010). 
121 I.R.M. 25.2.2.8, Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding (06-18-2010). 
122 I.R.M. 25.2.2.9, Award Computation (06-18-2010). 
123 I.R.M. 25.2.2.5, Grounds for Not Processing Claims for Award (06-18-2010). 
124 I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (stating “The 
requirement that claims be paid from collected proceeds generally means that payment will 
not be made until there is a final determination of tax liability (including taxes, penalties, 
interest, additions to tax and additional amounts) owed to the Service and such amounts 
have been collected by the Service. A final determination of tax does not occur until the 
statutory period for filing a claim for refund expires or there is an agreement between the 
taxpayer and the Service that there has been a final determination of tax for a specific 
period and a waiver of the right to file a claim for refund is effective.”).  
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under § 6511 has passed before it will issue payment.125  While definitive 
with respect to that narrow circumstance, it leaves open questions of when 
finality is achieved with respect to court proceedings, settlements, and 
closing agreements.  The I.R.M. is utterly silent as to when “measurement” 
of collected proceeds will occur.   Some of these open questions from the 
I.R.M. were addressed in the current Service guidance;126 however, these 
attempts for clarification have also led to inconsistent guidance. 
 
D.  Office of Chief Counsel Memoranda 
 
Despite two I.R.M. revisions in less than two years,127 Service guidance 
is needed to further delineate collected proceeds.  The Service recognizes 
this and has issued a few pieces of guidance.128  Unfortunately, even with 
the additional guidance, holes remain.  Worse, the guidance contradicts the 
most recent I.R.M. 
 
  The most recent guidance has come in the form of Office of Chief 
Counsel Memoranda and the Final Regulation issued in February 2012.  In 
a 2010 internal memorandum, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel analyzed 
whether criminal fines should be used as part of collected proceeds.129  The 
Office concluded, “that criminal fines, which must be deposited into the 
Crime Victims Fund (CVF), cannot be used for the payment of 
whistleblower awards.”130  This response is consistent with the revisions to 
the 2010 I.R.M. regarding criminal fines and their exclusion from collected 
                                                
125 I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(6), Funding Awards (06-18-2010) (stating “until there is a final 
determination of tax liability (including taxes, penalties, interest, additions to tax and 
additional amounts) owed to the Service and such amounts have been collected by the 
Service.  A final determination does not occur until the statutory period for filing a claim 
for refund expires or there is an agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS that there has 
been a final determination of tax for a specific period and a waiver of the right to file a 
claim for refund is effective.”).  See also I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(7), Funding Awards (06-18-
2010) (stating “The award payment cannot be completed until the statutory period for filing 
a claim for refund expires or there is an agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS that 
there has been a final determination of tax for the specific period and the right to file a 
claim for a refund has been waived.”). See also I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority 
and Policy (06-18-2010), supra note 124. 
126 See supra text accompanying notes 127-135. 
127 The Service amended I.R.M. 25.2.2 in December 2008 and again in June 2010.  
128 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 22, 2012); Program Manager 
Technical Assistance, PTMA 2010-60, Criminal Fines and Whistleblower Awards, (Feb. 
22, 2010); Program Manager Technical Assistance, PTMA 2010-62, Payment of Refund 
Protection and Credit Reduction Claims, (Sept. 1, 2010).   
129 See PTMA 2010-60, supra note 128 at 1.  
130 Id.  
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proceeds.131   
 
Later in 2010, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel again clarified collected 
proceeds in a subsequent memorandum.  PTMA 2010-62 attempted to 
clarify the inclusion of “Payment of Refund Protection and Credit 
Reduction Claims” in collected proceeds.132  The memorandum considers 
refund denials and some credit reduction claims as part of “collected 
proceeds” when determining whistleblower awards.133  The controversial 
part stated that “collected proceeds . . . include denied refunds and the 
reduction of an overpayment of a credit balance when the information 
provided by the whistleblower prevents the IRS from paying the refund or 
applying a credit balance to offset other tax liabilities.”134  
 
Both memoranda offered guidance on specific types of collected 
proceeds but still failed to offer a clear and concise definition.  This 
guidance is important because it signifies the Service’s commitment to 
clarifying the term “collected proceeds” as it relates to §7623.  However, 
despite the well-meaning attempts to narrow the definition of collected 
proceeds, this guidance has been difficult to reconcile with the I.R.M.  
Indeed, the 2010 I.R.M. specifically states that refund claims and credit 
balances are not included in collected proceeds calculations.135  
Acknowledging the need for further clarification, the IRS issued Final 
Regulation § 301.7623-1 in February 2012 to clarify the ambiguous 
“proceeds” terminology. 
 
                                                
131  See e.g. I.R.M. 25.2.2.12, Funding Awards (06-18-2010) (The 2010 I.R.M. states 
that “[c]riminal fines, which must be deposited into the Victims of Crime Fund, cannot be 
used for payment of whistleblower awards.”).  Compare I.R.M. 25.2.2.13, Partial 
Allowances (04-27-1999)  (The 1999 I.R.M. stated that “[a] reward should not be paid with 
respect to a particular tax year until the deficiency (tax, penalties, and fines) has been paid 
in full for that specific tax year. However, a partial reward may be paid if, for example, it 
can be ascertained in a criminal prosecution case that the conviction was directly or 
indirectly attributable to the informant’s information. A reward allowance based on the fine 
when paid may be made as a partial allowance prior to the civil settlement of the tax 
liability.”).  See also infra text accompanying notes 227-231 (discussing criminal fines). 
132 See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128.  
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
135 I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(1), Funding Awards (06-18-2010) (states “credit balance” 
reduction is not within scope of collected proceeds.  See also I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(7), Overview: 
Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (disallowing “information which leads to denial of a 
clam for refund which otherwise would have been paid.”).  
22 Paying the IRS Whistleblower 1-Mar-12 
E.  Treasury Regulation § 301.7623-1 
 
Enhancing the certainty of an award for potential whistleblowers is a 
primary objective of an effective incentive program.136 As discussed in the 
Program administration concerns above, the timing of the award payment is 
key to creating a successful incentive-based Program.137   The question of 
when will payment occur and how much will be paid are inextricably tied.  
While the 2006 amendments attempted to add greater certainty to the 
payment percentages, the question of what is the proper basis to calculate 
the reward upon has yet to be properly defined.  The IRS acknowledged this 
concern and issued a Proposed Regulation in January 2011, which it made 
final in February 2012.  The key terms to define in the 2006 changes to 
§7623 are “proceeds of amounts collected” and “collected proceeds.”  
 
The Internal Revenue Manual had generally regarded collected proceeds 
as “new monies collected,”138 but § 301.7623-1(a)(2) builds upon the 2010 
Chief Counsel guidance regarding refunds denials and overpayment credit 
balances.139  The Regulation attempts to resolve outstanding questions 
regarding the definition of “proceeds of amounts collected” and “collected 
proceeds” for purposes of § 7623.140  The refund prevention claims apply to 
whistleblower claims under either § 7623(a) and (b).  The Regulation also 
provides that the reduction of an overpayment credit balance may also be 
used to determine proceeds of amounts collected and collected proceeds 
under § 7623.141  
 
The Regulation includes as “both proceeds of amounts collected and 
collected proceeds . . . tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and 
                                                
136 See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 5 at 1172 (“Expressed economically, an agency 
should increase bounty incentives until the administrative costs incurred by the marginal 
inflow of the tips exceed the value of the agency marginal incentive in regulatory 
effectiveness.  Thus, agencies should maximize a potential informants discounted rewards 
ad minimize his discounted losses without making the mix so attractive as to induce the 
disclosure of large amounts of bad information.” (internal citations omitted)).  
137 See supra text and charts accompanying notes 68-73. 
138 I.R.M. 25.2.2.1, Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010). 
139 See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128. 
140 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a)(2) (as amended Feb, 22, 2012) (The Regulation 
defines collected proceeds to “include: tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and 
additional amounts collected by reason of the information provided; amounts collected 
prior to receipt of the information if the information provided results in the denial of a 
claim for refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a reduction of an overpayment 
credit balance used to satisfy a tax liability incurred because of the information provided.”). 
141 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a) (as amended Feb. 22, 2012). 
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additional amounts collected by reason of the information provided.”142  
The Regulation does not include “fines,” likely to support the Service’s 
position that 42 U.S.C. § 10610 does not allow the Service access to 
proceeds for distribution.143  It also inserts interest as another item to 
consider as collected proceeds.  This Regulation allows for a “catch all” for 
other sums to include in the award determination.  
 
Following the release of the 2011 Proposed Regulation, the IRS 
Whistleblower Office expressed limitations that are inherent to the 
definition of “collected proceeds” in its 2010 Annual Report to Congress.  
“The definition of “collected proceeds” does not extend to all recoveries 
from taxpayers.”144  The report cites two key areas that do not result in 
collected proceeds: (1) a taxpayer with a net operating loss carryforward 
from a prior year or carried back from a future tax year and (2) a taxpayer 
subject to certain criminal fines.145  Under either of the two alternatives, the 
whistleblower’s information may prove accurate; however, the potential 
collection from the taxpayer is resolved in a way that does not generate 
proceeds as defined in § 7623 or its Regulations.146  The acknowledgment 
from the Whistleblower Office of the limitations of the term collected 
proceeds for criminal fines and net operating losses is a good indication that 
the Service is attempting consistency throughout its internal guidance and 
I.R.M., but there are still concerns that not all Service explanations of 
collected proceeds achieve this same level of consistency.   
 
The Service again acknowledged these issues in the preamble to Final 
Regulation § 301.7623-1.  While the Service adopted the same language in 
the Final Regulation as was proposed in Proposed Regulation, the Service 
used the Final Regulation’s preamble to make clear that Whistleblower tips 
that involve net operating losses and criminal fines may not result in 
collected proceeds from which to pay a Whistleblower.   
 
F.  Inconsistencies and Unresolved Areas of Collected Proceeds 
 
As stated above, the I.R.M. now states that the Service will use “the best 
information available” to determine the amount in dispute in determining 
                                                
142 Id. 
143 See infra text accompanying notes 223-238 (discussing criminal fines).  
144 See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 12 (describing 
“Other Issues of Interest”). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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“ground for not processing claims for award.”147  This language is 
inherently vague and ambiguous.  The goal of providing certainty of an 
incentive fails terribly under such a definition to determine when a tip does 
not warrant an award.  Adding to the lack of certainty in the award payment 
is the failure to address the award calculation when the IRS calculates a 
total tax deficiency due from the tax wrongdoer and the deficiency 
calculation is greatly reduced by an offer of compromise.   Not only is the 
award payout amount unclear, but so is the timing of when the payment will 
occur.  This lack of finality,148 as it applies to court proceedings, 
settlements, and closing agreements, creates significant uncertainty risk to 
the whistleblower.    If a whistleblower is unsure when he or she will 
receive an award or how that award will be calculated, then that 
whistleblower is much less likely to come forward.149 
Worse than the lack of guidance are the inconsistencies written into the 
I.R.M. The Service issued contrary guidance to two I.R.M. provisions mere 
months after it released the 2010 I.R.M. revision.  I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(1) states 
“credit balance” reduction is not within scope of collected proceeds, and 
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(7) disallows “information which leads to denial of a clam 
for refund which otherwise would have been paid.”  Less than 3 months 
later, the Office of Chief Counsel wrote PTMA 2010-62, which specifically 
allows award based on “overpayment credit balances” and refund protection 
claims.  The latter interpretation was validated by the Proposed 
Regulation150 released six months later on January 18, 2011, signifying that 
the Service had come to a clear conclusion.  The Proposed Regulation was 
subject to an open comment period.  Not surprisingly, many whistleblower 
advocates were quick to point out the inconsistency in drafting as well as 
shortfalls of the definition of “collected proceeds” proposed.151  The 
                                                
147 I.R.M. 25.2.2.5, Grounds for Not Processing Claims for Award (06-18-2010). 
148 I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (stating “The 
requirement that claims be paid from collected proceeds generally means that payment will 
not be made until there is a final determination of tax liability (including taxes, penalties, 
interest, additions to tax and additional amounts) owed to the Service and such amounts 
have been collected by the Service. A final determination of tax does not occur until the 
statutory period for filing a claim for refund expires or there is an agreement between the 
taxpayer and the Service that there has been a final determination of tax for a specific 
period and a waiver of the right to file a claim for refund is effective.”). 
149 See Ferziger and Currell, supra note 5 at 1181 (“an informant’s perception of his 
likelihood of actually recovering a bounty seriously impacts his willingness to provide 
information by discounting, sometimes heavily, the potential value of the bounty or other 
reward.”). 
150 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1. 
151 See Letter from Scott Knott and Gregory Lyman, Ferraro Law Firm., to Kristen 
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whistleblower advocates offered suggestions for improving the language of 
the Proposed Treasury Regulation.  None of these suggestions were 
incorporated into the Final Regulation’s language; however, some of the 
concerns were noted in the preamble.  The whistleblower advocates’ 
suggestions are analyzed in Part III below.152      
 
III.  WHISTLEBLOWER ADVOCATES’ INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTED 
PROCEEDS 
 
On January 18, 2011, the IRS published Proposed Regulation § 
301.7623-1, to clarify “the definition of proceeds of amounts collected and 
collected proceeds under section 7623”153 and requested comments.  In 
response, seventeen written comments were received from whistleblower 
advocates,154 a student and an anonymous taxpayer.155  A few months later, 
on May 11, 2011, five whistleblower attorneys testified at a hearing on the 
Proposed Regulation.156  In their hearing testimony and written comments, 
whistleblower attorneys generally argued for a more expansive reading of 
collected proceeds.  While a more expansive reading is certainly in the 
whistleblower attorneys’ interest as well as their clients’, an expansive 
reading may result in a loss of federal revenue protection.  Whistleblower 
advocate comments have offered evidence that the current Service approach 
is overly narrow, provides conflicting guidance, and fails to account for the 
variety of forms and scenarios in whistleblower cases.  The Service 
acknowledges it has provided insufficient guidance both explicitly in a 
Whistleblower Office report and implicitly in the preamble to the Final 
Regulation.157  It is not clear, however, if the Service understands the 
                                                                                                                       
Witter, Internal Revenue Service (Aug. 18, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 
2011-17953 (discussing the conflicts between I.R.M. 25.2.2.12 and PTMA 2010-62). See 
also infra text accompanying notes 153-270 (discussing alternative proposals regarding 
collected proceeds). 
152 See infra text accompanying notes 153-277.   
153 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1, 76 Fed. Reg. 2852 (Jan. 18, 2011).   
154 See Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (Feb. 21, 2012).  See also Collected 
Comments on Proposed Regulations: Payment of Whistleblower Rewards, 2011 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 90-33 (May 9, 2011). (comments were submitted by individual 
whistleblower attorneys, their law firms, and a group representing the interests of 
whistleblower attorneys, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund). 
155 See Collected Comments, supra note 154.  
156 See generally Hearing Transcript, supra note 22.  
157 See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra 
note 1 at 7.  See also Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 21, 2012) 
(noting that the Regulation does not address all of the concerns voiced in by commenters, 
including the ability of the Service to compensate a Whistleblower for a tip that prevents 
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severity of the insufficiency, or if the Service fully appreciates the need for 
drafting specific language to account for the wide variety of potential issues 
in whistleblower cases.  
 
Whistleblower advocates’ proposals regarding collected proceeds can 
generally be grouped into five proposal types warranting attention.158 The 
following Part will evaluate the whistleblower advocates’ proposals for (1) 
an expanded definition of collected proceeds,159 the inclusion of (2) tax 
attributes,160 (3) overpayments credit balances,161 and (4) criminal fines162 
in the definition as well as the (5) finality163 and (6) timing issues.164  
 
A.  What are Collected Proceeds? 
 
Some whistleblower advocates have suggested broad standards for 
interpreting collected proceeds.  One position that has been advocated is 
utilizing the standard “for the benefit of the Treasury” when considering 
what should be a collected proceed.165  Other whistleblower advocates 
suggested equating collected proceeds to “net positive effect” for the U.S. 
                                                                                                                       
future tax avoidance). 
158 See infra text accompanying notes 165-269.  It should be noted that in the hearing 
and comment letters whistleblower attorneys made other suggestions, however, we have 
confined our comments to the most frequently mentioned and/or meritorious.  
159 See infra text accompanying notes 165-174 (discussing the potential for an 
expanded definition of collected proceeds). 
160 See infra text accompanying notes 175-207 (discussing exclusion of tax attributes 
from collected proceeds). 
161 See infra text accompanying notes 208-222 (discussing the partial inclusion of 
credit balances in collected proceeds). 
162 See infra text accompanying notes 223-238 (discussing the partial exclusion of 
criminal fines from collected proceeds). 
163 See infra text accompanying notes 239-269 (discussing issues of tax liability 
finality for the purposes of collected proceeds). 
164 See infra text accompanying notes 270-277 (discussing the timing of measuring 
collected proceeds and the timing of paying awards based on collected proceeds). 
165 See Letter from Michael Sullivan and Richard Rubin, Finch McCranie LLP, to 
Kristen Witter and Richard Hurst, Internal Revenue Serv., at 4-5 (Apr. 18, 2011), available 
at 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 77-20, (stating that “[f]undamental to an IRS whistleblower 
program is the concept of benefit to the Treasury. As the fundamental underlying the 
program, logically "benefit to the Treasury" should serve as the basis for determining and 
quantifying whistleblower rewards, and therefore as the basis for determining Collected 
Proceeds. Furthermore, we understand that the yardstick of benefit to the Treasury was 
applied in determining payments under the pre- 2006 IRS whistleblower program.”). See 
also Hearing Transcript, supra note 22 at 14 (remarks of Richard Rubin stating, “Very 
much echoing the comments of my colleagues, I would suggest that collective proceeds, 
the fundamental there, is net benefit to the Treasury. It's as simple as that.”). 
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Treasury.166 
Unfortunately, neither proposal is feasible for a successful 
administration of the Whistleblower Program.  The phrases “for the benefit 
of the Treasury” and “net positive effect” to the Treasury are even more 
amorphous and ambiguous than the current collected proceeds standard.  
Without adopting significant guidance defining “for the benefit of the 
Treasury” or “net positive effect,” neither of these terms are practical 
solutions.  The proposed terms are not workable because neither term offers 
a certain calculation and would merely create confusion in award 
determinations.  The Treasury has the benefit of funds deposited within it, 
and similarly funds deposited with the Treasury have a net positive effect. 
The Treasury derives no current benefit from funds not deposited. 
Uncollected tax liabilities are speculative future benefits for the Treasury.   
Paying a whistleblower award from not yet (if ever) collected funds does 
not create any certain positive or beneficial effect to the Treasury.   
There is a potential positive effect to the Treasury if proceeds are in fact 
collected at a later date.  However, such payments also risk a potential 
negative effect on the Treasury if no future proceeds are collected but funds 
have already been paid as an award to a whistleblower. Proposals for 
adoption of either phrase as equivalent to or instead of collected proceeds 
are thinly veiled attempts to read “collected” out of collected proceeds in 
order to expand the basis for paying whistleblowers.  These proposals are 
attempts to have the Service pay whistleblowers without necessarily having 
the proceeds in hand.  Further, these proposals leave open the very real 
possibility of paying whistleblowers from uncollected, and possibility never 
collected, funds.  This payment system entirely conflicts with a primary 
objective of the Whistleblower Program: federal revenue protection. 
Using a standard that attempts to read “collected” out of the statute is 
contrary to the legislative intent of the whistleblower statutes.  The word 
                                                
166 See Hearing Transcript, supra note 22, at 14 (remarks of Thomas Pliske, stating “I 
think net positive effect are three good words that should be used to define collected 
proceeds. If the government comes out ahead whether it's a reducement of the assessment 
because it's a tax calculation or it's the payment of the liability from a credit, either way the 
government is positively affected and the definition should be expanded to include not 
operating loss.”).  See also id. (remarks of Linda Stengle, stating “The key issue here is: 
Was there a positive net effect on the Treasury? Positive net effect on the Treasury should 
be the basis for calculating the award to the whistleblower.  When you broaden the 
definition and you focus on positive net effect to the Treasury, then its going to be a lot 
easier for the Whistleblower’s Office to make their calculations.”). 
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“collected” was intentionally included in the statute to modify proceeds.167  
Senator Grassley authored the 2006 IRS whistleblower amendments as well 
as the 1986 False Claims Act qui tam whistleblower provisions.168  The 
False Claims Act served as a model for the 2006 IRS whistleblower 
amendments.169 A qui tam plaintiff170 recovery under the 1986 False Claims 
legislation is paid as a percentage of the “proceeds” of the action or 
settlement of the claim.171  Twenty years later, Senator Grassley, drafted 
that tax whistleblower recoveries were to be made from “collected 
proceeds.”172  He has expressly stated he based the IRS whistleblower 
provisions on the qui tam provisions.173 When examining legislation by the 
same author for similar purposes (e.g., to reward efforts that assist in 
recovering amounts owed to the federal government), it follows that the use 
of different terminology must have meaning, particularly the addition of a 
modifying term.  Despite definitional proposals to the contrary,174 the term 
“collected” cannot simply be read out of the statute and its usage has a clear 
purpose in the statutory language. 
B.  Tax Attributes 
 
While the terminology proposals in Subpart IV.A. above have gained 
some support of whistleblower advocates,175 the proposals  ignore the need 
to define “proceed” and what it means for a “proceed” to be collected.  This 
failure reappears in examining another, more common proposal of 
whistleblower attorneys: to treat tax attributes176 as collected proceeds.  
                                                
167 This modifying term is a result of the 1986 False Claims Act language requiring 
“recovery”.  See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. 
168 See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 1. 
169 Id. 
170 For the purposes of this article, both a qui tam plaintiff under the False Claims Act 
and a whistleblower/informant under the IRS provisions will be referred to as 
whistleblowers.   
171 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
172 § 7623(b)(1).  Please note that a version of § 7623(a) was adopted in 1998 and uses 
the term “proceeds of amounts collected.”  See supra text accompanying notes 99-106 
(explaining that the Service treats “proceeds of collected amounts” and “collected 
proceeds” as having the same meaning).  
173 See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 1.  
174 See supra text accompanying notes 165-174 (discussing proposed changes to the 
term “collected proceeds”). 
175 See supra text accompanying notes 165-174. 
176 Tax attribute is defined § 108(b)(2) to include the following: net operating losses, 
general business credits, minimum tax credits, capital loss carryovers, basis of property, 
passive activity loss and credit carryovers and foreign tax credit carryovers. 
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A proceed is “that which results, proceeds, or accrues from some 
possession or transaction.”177  With respect to a tax whistleblower case, 
proceeds are that which results from the passing of information to the 
Service.  Admittedly, by definition, proceeds do not necessarily have to be 
money.178 This is certainly so in the tax context.  Fundamental tax concepts, 
such as gross income179 and amount realized,180 contemplate far more than 
cash in hand.181  Proceeds as more than money received have also been 
allowed in some qui tam cases.182 
While the definition of proceed expands beyond cash on hand, allowing 
the reduction of tax attributes such as net operating losses (NOLs), capital 
loss carryovers, foreign tax credits, and other tax credits, to be quantified as 
proceeds fails to comply with the fundamental structure of the U.S. income 
tax system.  Calculation of U.S. income tax for both individuals and 
businesses requires the addition, subtraction, and limitation of multiple tax 
items.183  While the starting point of calculation is gross income,184 and the 
                                                
177 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 6th ed. at 1204-5 (defining proceeds). 
178 Id. (defining proceeds and noting “[p]roceeds does not necessarily mean only cash 
or money.”). 
179 § 61(a) (Gross incomes “means all income from whatever sources derived.”). 
180 § 1001(b) (Amount realized is the “sum of any money received plus the fair market 
value of the property (other than money) received.”). 
181 See generally Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (“Here 
we have undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers 
have complete dominion.”), Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 Cum. Bull. 60 (concluding that the 
“fair market value of property or services taken into payment must be included into 
income.”). 
182 See Letter from Susan Strawn, Cleveland Lawrence III, Erika Kelton, and Paul D. 
Scott, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue 
Service at 5 note 7 (Apr. 18, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY, Doc 2011-8440 (“For 
example, United States, ex rel. Thornton v. Science Applications Int'l Corp., 207 F.3d 769 
(5th Cir. 2000), held that the value of settled claims in a non-cash recovery should be 
included as part of a relator's share award. Thornton further concluded that the government 
has a duty to advise the relator of the value of the settlement, including the non-cash 
proceeds. United States, ex rel. Barajas v. United States, 258 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), 
likewise ruled that settlement proceeds need not always consist of money or some tangible 
asset, and that a whistleblower was entitled to a share of the value of a non-cash settlement. 
In Barajas, the court concluded that the whistleblower should share in the value of repairs 
to faulty data transmitters -- non-cash services valued at as much as $10 million dollars. 
See also United States ex rel. Nudelman v. International Rehabilitation Associates, 2005 
US Dist. LEXIS 9605 (E.D. Penn. 2005), concluding that the relator should share in the 
value of three year monitoring agreement (valued at $1.5 million).”).  
183 See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, AND LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, 
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 2-2 (3d 2002) (explaining and listing the calculation 
of federal income tax liability) 
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ending point is tax liability,185 the calculation requires other items, 
specifically tax attributes like the ones mentioned above to be accounted 
for.  The Service requires reporting of much information other than tax 
liability,186 but the Service collects only two things from taxpayers: 
information and money.  Anything other than money is information.  While 
a tax attribute may serve to reduce tax liability, it is not collected and cannot 
be under the current U.S. tax structure.   
That is not to say that tax attributes never have value. Tax attributes 
may have value under certain circumstances.  The effort to consider tax 
attributes as proceeds recognizes their very real value, in many but not all 
cases, to taxpayers.  In many merger and acquisition deals, NOLs and other 
tax attributes are given value.187  They are certainly considered in 
negotiating the structure of a deal and factor into price.188 Accounting rules 
for taxes, ASC 740, requires businesses to characterize NOLs as assets.189  
Indeed, an NOL is listed on a balance sheet as a deferred tax asset.190   
                                                                                                                       
184 Id. (listing gross income as the starting point).  
185 Id. at 2-7 (“The statutory concept of taxable income is the end product  . . . 
determining what shall be included, excluded, or deducted in computing tax liability . . ..”).  
186 See generally Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax 
Gap: When is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010) 
(discussing the policy and effect of information reporting and citing numerous examples). 
187 Thomas W. Bottomlee, Jason S. Bazar and Arthur C. Walker, Don’t Ignore a 
Target’s NOLs: The Price and Structure of Your Deal Can Depend on Them, 9 THE M&A 
JOURNAL 7 (“Generally, where the parties settle on a stock deal, the NOL carryforwards of 
a target “C” corporation will transfer with and be available to the target corporation. 
Accordingly, a target corporation’s NOL carryforwards that exist as of the closing date 
represent an economic asset of the target – the possible reduction of future income taxes. 
Thus, these NOLs may be of some value to some buyers, even in this dismal market. 
However, our experience has shown that when deal makers are negotiating the purchase 
price for a target’s stock they will often either fail to address the potential value of these 
NOLs or at least fail to address the value early enough in the process to make a meaningful 
difference. In addition, if the issue does arise in price negotiations, buyers often argue that 
the market price for NOLs is “pennies on the dollar.”). See also Larry Maples, Pitfalls in 
Preserving Net Operating Losses, CPA JOURNAL (March 2007) (“The “value” of a net 
operating loss (NOL) depends not only upon its size, but also on the amount of income the 
law allows the NOL to offset.”). 
188 See Bottomlee, supra note 187.  
189 FIN. STANDARDS ACCT. BOARD, Acct. Standards Codification 740, Income Taxes.   
190 See also Anthony Catanach and Shelley Wells-Catanach, Net Operating Losses: 
How Much Are These "Assets" Really Worth?, 21 COMMERCIAL LENDING REV. 4 (July 
2006) (stating “FAS-109 allows these potential tax savings to be recorded on the 
company's balance sheet as a deferred tax asset, given that positive future cash flows are 
expected from the tax savings generated by the NOL's use.”). 
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For businesses that are going concerns with reasonable expectations of 
future profits, tax attributes no doubt have value. For businesses that can 
create tax structures that sell, exchange, or leverage them, they also have 
value.191  There are, of course, limitations to NOL usage, including the 
NOL limitation rule related to certain changing ownership.192  While NOLs 
and other tax attributes are assets, they are assets with no inherent payment 
value until they are utilized to offset tax liability.  Section 172(b)(1)(A) 
allows NOLs to be carried back to offset tax liability for two years and 
carried forward to offset future tax liability for 20 years.193 This long time 
horizon for potential benefit recognition is a key argument against allowing 
NOLs to constitute proceeds in the year the NOL reduction occurs. There 
are many extenuating circumstances that would preclude a business from 
recognizing the benefit of the NOL such as change in business form, 
subsequent years of NOLs, or winding up a business.  
Even though tax attributes are valuable to businesses in many cases, 
they do not rise to the level of a proceed until they are utilized to offset tax 
owed.  They do not represent any “end” in the tax process. They are not 
equivalent to tax owed.  They are a part of the calculation that leads to tax 
liability.194  It is the adjustment of tax liability that should be the starting 
definition for what is a proceed.   
A tax liability can be compromised by the Service or not paid at all for 
innumerable reasons.195  This reality forms the basis of the need for the 
proceeds to be collected.  For tax purposes, collection is the fundamental 
purpose of the Service.196  The agency exists to collect revenue.  It does not 
                                                
191 See Robert Rizzi, New Respect for “Trafficking” in Losses, NOL Protections Take 
Hold., 37-3 CORPORATE TAXATION 30 (“The result was the development of a cottage 
industry of tax planning to maneuver taxpayers safely around the hair trigger, and to permit 
the use of NOLs under many conditions that might, in substance, actually involve 
trafficking in NOLs.”). 
192 See generally § 382. 
193 § 172(b)(1)(A).  This time frame has been periodically modified.  A temporary tax 
provision allowed carryback for five years for 2008 and 2009 NOLs see § 172(b)(1)(H). 
194 See Preamble to Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 21, 2012) (“tax attributes 
such as NOLs are component elements of a taxpayer’s liability.”). 
195 See e.g. Authority for Offers in Compromise (OIC) is found at § 7122, and an OIC 
is executed via Forms 656, 733-A and 733-B.  Authority for Appeals Office settlement is 
found at Reg. § 601.106, and Appeals Settlements are executed on Forms 870, 870-AD or 
890.  Authority to Closing Agreements is found at § 7121, and closing agreements can be 
executed on Forms 866 and 906.  
196 See SALTZMAN, supra note 107 at 1-5 (“its distinct objective of revenue 
collection”). 
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collect tax attributes or more specifically, NOLs.  The existence of a tax 
attribute does not have a direct revenue impact to the Treasury.  The Service 
collects money or seizes assets that it liquidates into money, and it has 
broad powers of collection.197 The Service has never seized an NOL, nor 
could it.  The Service would never seize an NOL because an NOL has no 
independent value to the Service. To collect means to “claim as due and 
receive payment for.”198  Payment is axiomatic to this inquiry.  
While a whistleblower tip that serves to reduce a current NOL does not 
rise to the level of collected proceeds, that does not mean, however, the 
NOLs reduction cannot or will not be liquidated and collected at a future 
point.   In the preamble to the Final Regulation, the Service explained that if 
a whistleblower tip resulted in a reduced NOL, which had previously been 
used in full to generate a refund, “then the amount of the erroneous refund 
recovered and collected would be collected proceeds.”199  The timing of the 
collection of tax proceeds is at issue.  Proceeds that are not currently 
collected are not entertained under the statute.  The Service would have to 
deem it collected in guidance.  Such guidance, however, is contrary to the 
legislative intent requiring the collection of revenues.  The use of the term 
collected implies that funds must be in hand, and that the proceeds must 
have been liquidated and accepted by the Service.  For the Service to deem 
a proceed collected without having it in hand also presents another problem 
for § 7623(a), which states that a whistleblower award “shall be paid from 
the proceeds of amounts collected.”200  Without any collection, there are no 
proceeds from which to pay under subsection (a). 
The original drafter of the whistleblower amendments, Senator 
Grassley, commented that he would like to see a more inclusive definition 
of collected proceeds.201  While Senator Grassley might want to reward 
whistleblowers for information that leads to a reduction in an NOL, he has 
expressly recognized that the statutory language makes this impossible.202  
In a September 13, 2011 letter to IRS Commissioner Shulman, Senator 
                                                
197 Id. at 15-3 (“the organization and operation of the collection function, as well as the 
substantive law of liens and levies, give the Service broad and formidable powers to collect 
delinquent taxes.”).   
198 MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/collect?show=1&t=1325105771 (defining collect).  
199 See Preamble to Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb, 21, 2012).  
200 § 7623(a). Section 7623(b) differs slightly in that it states that a whistleblower “ 
shall . . . receive an award  . . . of the collected proceeds . . . resulting from the action . . ..”   
201 See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 7.  
202 Id. 
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Grassley stated that  
“[i]t is important for whistleblower confidence - and tax administration - 
that whistleblowers be rewarded for providing information about 
income being reduced by net operating losses (NOLs).  I understand that 
this is a difficult issue as IRS does not collect payments of tax in such 
cases and so a whistleblower award likely could not be made until a 
taxpayer's NOLs are fully utilized and pays taxes.”203  
 At its heart, Senator Grassley’s statement recognizes that whistleblower 
payments based on the reduction of a tax attribute are not possible until 
proceeds are collected.  Senator Grassley’s acknowledgement is important 
because he has long endorsed expanding and increasing the utilization of 
the Whistleblower Program.   
A compromise offered by some whistleblower advocates is to calculate 
a present value for the tax attribute.204  Whistleblower advocates have 
argued the appropriate treatment of a tax attribute reduction, specifically an 
NOL, is to pay a whistleblower a percentage of a present value 
calculation.205  While administratively tidy and efficient, this calculation 
would remove the requirement of “collected” from the whistleblower 
statute.  It presumes future collection, which may not occur, and it also does 
not solve the problem of fulfilling the § 7623 requirements that 
whistleblower awards be paid from proceeds.  Based on the definition of 
proceed206 and the value given to a tax attribute within the Code,207 tax 
attributes fail to provide collection as required under statute to pay a 
whistleblower award.   
C.  Overpayment Credit Balances 
 
The 2012 Final Regulation states that collected proceeds include “a 
reduction of an overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax liability 
incurred because of the information provided.”208  PMTA 2010-62 verified 
the Service’s position that the reduction of “an overpayment credit balance” 
                                                
203 Id. 
204 See Sullivan and Rubin Letter, supra note 165 at 6-8 (suggesting use of present 
value calculations and discount factors in valuing whistleblower payments for proceeds not 
yet collected). 
205 Id. 
206 See supra text accompanying note 177. 
207 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a)(2) (as amended Feb. 22, 2012). 
208 Id. 
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is included in collected proceeds,209 despite conflicting guidance in the 
current I.R.M.210 
 
Whistleblower attorneys have suggested that the term “credit balance” is 
a poor choice of terminology because it is not a term used with respect to 
corporate taxpayers.211  This is correct.  Credit balance is rarely found 
outside of the retirement account tax context212 or I.R.M. references to 
procedures for dealing with taxpayer accounts.213  This poor word choice 
has required the Service to further explain its interpretation of overpayment 
credit balance.  
 
Although “credit balance” is an imprecise term, the inclusion of 
“overpayment” as the modifier offers significant clarity in interpreting the 
Service’s intentions.  There are many reasons that a taxpayer, individual or 
business, might have a credit balance with the Service, including 
overpayments, outstanding refundable or nonrefundable credits, or even 
certain tax attributes.214 The use of the term overpayment, however, 
presumes to exclude all positive tax account balances that are the result of 
                                                
209 See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128 (analyzing the payment of refund protection 
and credit reduction claims under § 7623). 
210 I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(1) (Jun. 18 2010 version) (“’satisfaction of taxpayers’ liabilities by 
reducing a credit balance is not within the scope of collected proceeds.”). 
211 See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 4 (“ . . . the Proposed Regulations are 
simply too narrowly drafted to with respect to the impact of credits on complex corporate 
returns.”).  See also Letter from Linda Stengle, Kenney & McCafferty, PC, to Richard 
Hurst, Internal Revenue Service at 1 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY, Doc 
2011-4349. 
212 See e.g. I.R.M. 4.72.14.3, Technical Requirements (05-04-2001). 
213 See e.g. I.R.M. 1.2.50.3 Delegation Order 13-2 (Rev. 1) (03-03-2008), I.R.M. 
1.13.8.9 Browse Mode (See Exhibit 1.13.8-13 and Exhibit 1.13.8-15) (01-01-2006), I.R.M. 
1.13.9.5 Specific instructions for Section 594 returns (04-04-1998), I.R.M. 1.15.29.1 
Description and Authorities (07-01-2005), I.R.M. 2.3.29.5 Command Code ICOMP (06-
23-2009), I.R.M. 2.3.51.12 Table of Screen Exhibits (01-01-2011), I.R.M. 2.4.26.4 
Command Code FRM14 (03-30-2009), I.R.M. 2.4.26.3 Command Code FRM49 (03-30-
2009), I.R.M. 2.4.34.3 Terminal Responses for Command Code DOALL (07-01-2011), 
I.R.M. 2.4.34.2 Terminal Input For Command Code DOALL (01-01-2011), I.R.M. 
3.13.5.57 Glossary of Terms (01-01-2011), I.R.M. 3.13.12.1 Overview (01-01-2011), 
I.R.M. 3.13.12.22 EO Delinquency Notices (01-01-2011), I.R.M. 3.17.30.17 Special Non-
Master File (NMF) Procedures (01-01-2010), I.R.M. 3.17.30.5 Control Record List (01-01-
2010), I.R.M. 3.17.63.13 Account Series 4000 Liability Accounts (10-01-2004), I.R.M. 
3.17.63.26 Federal Tax Deposits (FTD) (07-27-2010), I.R.M. 3.17.64.16 Electronic 
Transmissions (09-01-2011), I.R.M. 3.17.64.9 CADE - Customer Account Data Engine 
(09-01-2011). 
214 See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 4 (stating “An ‘overpayment’ credit 
balance is just one of the many types of credit balances that exist under the IRC.”). 
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tax credits or losses.  Proper interpretation requires giving meaning to all 
terms.215   
 
Overpayment credit balance only allows refund of taxpayer’s balances 
that are a result of payments, as opposed to nonrefundable credits or tax 
attributes such as an NOL, capital loss carryforward, or a foreign tax credit.  
If a credit balance resulted from refundable credits and the taxpayer were 
refund eligible, then presumably the refund provisions of the Regulation 
would apply to allow a whistleblower tip that prevented a refund or enable 
the recapture of a refund would apply.  As such, use of “overpayment credit 
balance” in combination with the refund protection provision disallows 
whistleblower payments only on nonrefundable credits or tax attributes, 
which are items that are not automatically collected upon occurrence.    
 
The Service most recently clarified overpayment credit balance in the 
preamble to the Final Regulation.216  Specifically, the Service stated that use 
of overpayment credit balance includes credits to an individual or corporate 
taxpayer that could be refunded under § 6402, but does not include amounts 
such as § 6603 cash deposits.217  Because § 6402 authorizes the Service to 
refund overpayments to taxpayers,218 it follows that the Service would 
consider reductions of refund-eligible § 6402 overpayments to be reductions 
of overpayment credit balances.   
 
The Service’s notation of § 6603 is more difficult to interpret.  Section 
6603 allows taxpayers to make monetary deposits with the Service for taxes 
not yet due.219  Perhaps the Service’s attempt to distinguish cash deposits 
from overpayment credit balances is driven by the Service’s focus on 
“overpayment.”  By definition, a cash deposit “may be used  . . . to pay any 
                                                
215 See Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“It is the duty of the Court to 
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any 
construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language 
it employed.”). 
216 Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 22, 2012). 
217 Id. 
218 § 6402(a) (“In the case of any overpayment, the Secretary, within the applicable 
period of limitations, may credit the amount of such overpayment, including any interest 
allowed thereon, against any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on the part of the 
person who made the overpayment and shall, subject to subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f)  [1] 
refund any balance to such person.”). 
219 § 6603(a) (“A taxpayer may make a cash deposit with the Secretary which may be 
used by the Secretary to pay any tax imposed under subtitle A or B or chapter 41, 42, 43, or 
44 which has not been assessed at the time of the deposit. . . .”). 
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tax imposed . . . which has not been assessed at the time of deposit.”220  A 
cash deposit cannot be an “overpayment” because there was not yet a tax to 
pay.  The Service’s notation of § 6603 appears to be an attempt to insist on 
overpayment as a necessary requisite for funds to be an overpayment credit 
balance.    
 
The danger from the preamble’s treatment of § 6603 cash deposits is 
that Whistleblowers may infer that cash deposits do not qualify as collected 
proceeds.  If a cash deposit is used to “satisfy a tax liability incurred 
because of information provided,”221 then the cash deposit should be 
collected proceeds.  A reduction of a cash deposit due to a Whistleblower’s 
tip satisfies the elements of collected proceeds.  Moreover, the treatment of 
the reduction of a cash deposit should be no different than the treatment of 
the denial of a refund claim that would have otherwise been paid.222  
Utilization of cash deposits to satisfy increased tax liability due to a 
Whistleblower’s tip should be collected proceeds.  Accordingly, the 
Service’s use of § 6603 to delineate overpayment credit balances will likely 
create more confusion rather than providing clarity.  While the Service 
attempted to provide additional guidance for overpayment credit balances in 
the Regulation’s preamble, significant uncertainty still surrounds the 
inclusion of overpayment credit balances in collected proceeds.  
 
D.  Criminal Fines 
 
Other than the inclusion of tax attributes, the other proposals that 
received the most attention during the notice and comment period was the 
proposed inclusion of all criminal fines and restitution in collected 
proceeds.223  The Service has confirmed restitution’s inclusion in collected 
proceeds; 224 however, the Service’s exclusion of certain criminal fines from 
                                                
220 Id. 
221 Treas. Reg § 301.7623-1(a)(2).  
222 See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128. 
223 See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 6-8 (Apr. 18, 2011); Letter from 
Thomas Dunne, to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Service at 1-2 (Feb. 22, 2011), 
available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-3714; Letter from Thomas C. Pliske, Tax 
Whistleblower Law Firm LLC, to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Service at 15-17 (Mar. 
24, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-6549; Letter from Patrick Carmody, 
Carrig Counsel, to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Service at 2 (Mar. 28, 2011), available 
at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-6550; Strawn, Lawrence, Kelton and Scott Letter, supra 
note 182 at 6-7. 
224 Preamble to Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 22, 2012). 
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collected proceeds is a change from prior Service policy.225  The Service’s 
current policy is that criminal fines that are required to be deposited in the 
Crime Victims Fund under 42 U.S.C. § 10601 are not proceeds.226  The 
Service’s position implies that it believes the term collected in § 7623 
means collected by the Service.227  Fines that are deposited in the Crime 
Victims Fund are in fact collected; they are just not collected by the 
Service.   
A converse interpretation from the Service would create a statutory 
conflict in the availability of fund payouts.  If criminal fines are proceeds 
under § 7623 and collected means collected by the federal government (not 
only the Service), then this conflict would result in competing statutory 
guidance as to the proper availability of the fines for payments.  42 U.S.C. § 
10601 requires that the fines are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and 
available to programs under that section, and § 7623 requires making the 
fines available for whistleblower payments.  Some whistleblower advocates 
have suggested that, under statutory construction rules, the 2006 
amendments to § 7623 would prevail because they are more recent.228 This 
interpretation, however, assumes that criminal fines are proceeds under the 
statute, which may not be the case, and ignores a reading that does not 
create a conflict between the statutes.  The 2006 amendments added 
subsection § 7623(b), which includes a parenthetical after collected 
proceeds.229  The parenthetical states, “(including penalties, interest, 
additions to tax, and additional amounts)”.230   The term “fine” is not 
present in the parenthetical, despite the fact that this language had been 
included in previous IRS guidance.231  This suggests that the omission of 
                                                
225 See supra text accompanying notes 81-152 (discussing the Service’s policy 
regarding criminal fines).  See also supra text accompanying notes 127-135 (noting change 
in Service’s policy on the inclusion of all criminal fines in collected proceeds).   
226 Id. 
227 See PTMA 2010-60, supra note 128 (discussing IRS position that criminal fines 
required to be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund are not collected proceeds).   
228 Id. (“Although it is true, as you point out, that the 1996 amendments to § 7623 
providing award payments will be made from collected proceeds was enacted after the 
VOC Act, we do not think, as you suggest, that § 7623 can be interpreted to constitute an 
implied exception to the VOC Act.”). 
229 § 7623(b)(1). 
230 Id. 
231 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.10(1), Factors for Determining the Allowability of Claims (Apr. 
27, 1999) (“Rewards are paid only with respect to taxes, penalties and fines collected, and 
on amounts of revenues protected (claims or refund denied).”) (emphasis added).  See also 
I.R.M. 25.2.2.13(1)(a), Partial Allowances, (Apr. 27, 1999) (“However, a partial reward 
may be paid if, for example, it can be ascertained in a criminal prosecution case that the 
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the term “fine” is intentional because prior versions of the I.R.M. included 
fine as a basis for whistleblower payments.232   
 In administering the tax system, the Service uses penalties and interest 
as common terms and for taxpayers who pay late or fail to pay at all.233  
Whistleblower advocates have suggested that penalties should include 
criminal penalties.234  It could, but a rule of statutory construction is to first 
attempt to construe two potentially conflicting statutes so as to give them 
both meaning.235  This is possible only if criminal fines are not included in 
collected proceeds.  If collected proceeds do not include criminal fines, then 
there is no conflict between the statutes. 
 On the other hand, if criminal fines are part of collected proceeds, 
another administratively expedient reading, and one taken by the Service in 
PTMA 2010-60236 and verbally in the May 2011 hearing,237 would be to 
                                                                                                                       
conviction was directly or indirectly attributable to the informant’s information. A reward 
allowance based on the fine when paid may be made as a partial allowance prior to the civil 
settlement of the tax liability.”) (emphasis added). 
232 Id. 
233 See e.g. § 6601 et seq. (extensively using the term interest and detailing interest on 
tax liabilities and payments to the Service).  See also e.g. § 6651 et seq. (using the term 
penalty as well as the phrase “addition to tax” to detail taxpayer penalties for failure to pay 
a tax, accuracy-related tax issues, and fraud). 
234 See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 1-3 (Apr. 18, 2011); Dunne Letter, 
supra note 216 at 1-2; Pliske Letter, supra note 223 at 15-17; Carmody Letter, supra note 
223 at 2. 
235 See 73 AM JUR 2D STATUTES § 168 (2011) (“Ordinarily, related statutes should be 
construed, if possible, by reasonable interpretation, so as to give full force and effect to 
each of them, since, where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of the courts in the 
construction of statutes to harmonize and reconcile laws and to adopt that construction of a 
statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory provisions.”).   
236 See PTMA 2010-60, supra note 128. 
237 See Hearing Transcript, supra note 22 at 14 (statements of Thomas Kane, Office of 
Associate Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., stating “I think there is also a 
misconception out there about where we stand on criminal fines. I think the only thing that 
we have said so far with respect to criminal fines is with respect to a very narrow 
circumstance where criminal fines are deposited into and segregated into a fund 
specifically identified under Title XVIII or another title of the code. And because of the 
nature of that fund, we the Service can't get at it. I think that's the only thing that we talked 
about to date that's really specifically addressed that --.”).  See also id. (statements of 
Stephen A. Whitlock, Director, Whistleblower Office, Internal Revenue Serv., stating 
“Subsequent to the publication of the proposed rule, Chief Counsel released their opinion 
on the criminal fine issue and any fine that's required to be deposited into the Victims of 
Crime Fund would be outside the scope of our definition of proceeds from which we pay 
an award. My understanding is that's pretty much any criminal fine.”).  See also id. 
(statements of Kristen Witter, Office of Associate Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., 
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exclude only criminal fines that are deposited in the Crime Victim Fund 
under 42 U.S.C. § 10601.  This is not as clean of a statutory construction as 
the alternative explained above but still defensible by the Service.   
 Of course, it would be ideal if Congress added § 7623 as another 
express exception to 42 U.S.C. § 10601, but that is not a currently available 
option.  The Service is saddled with using statutory construction because it 
is tasked with administering and enforcing § 7623, which could conflict 
with 42 U.S.C. § 10601.  The Service cannot amend either statute, only 
Congress may do so.238  As such, the Service must offer guidance that 
attempts to harmonize both statutes. The Service does not have the choice to 
ignore either one. Its current attempt at harmonizing the statutes is not 
unreasonable and the result is that certain criminal fines are not be included 
in collected proceeds.   
E.  Finality Issues 
 
Whistleblower advocates have also expressed concern regarding when 
award payments are made.239  This concern is well founded, as the GAO’s 
Whistleblower Office audit concluded that “whistleblower claims can take 
years to process.”240 Indeed, one whistleblower attorney quotes a time 
period of “at least 5-6 years”241 from submission to payment.  Such lengths 
of time create a disincentive for whistleblowers to step forward, by 
temporally separating the risk they undertake and expected reward.   
The Service has lengthened the time period for whistleblower payment 
to achieve greater finality in the process.242  The Service policy for 
                                                                                                                       
stating “The Crime Victims Fund Act specifies that all criminal fines assessed by a district 
court are required to be deposited into this fund fines assessed for Title XXVI criminal 
violations are not excluded from that requirement, and we do not have access to those 
funds to be able to pay out awards.”).   
238 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”). 
239 See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 8-10.  See also Sullivan and Rubin 
Letter, supra note 165 at 6-8.  See also Patrick Carmody, Why do Whistleblower Cases 
Take so Long?, blog post, available at 
http://www.carrigcounsel.com/Carrig_Counsel_Tax_Whistleblower_IRS_Rewards/Alerts/
Entries/2011/7/15_Why_Do_Tax_Whistleblower_Cases_Take_So_Long.html (Jul. 15, 
2011).  
240 See GAO Report, supra note 76 at 8. 
241 See Carmody Blog Post, supra note 239. 
242 I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010). 
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whistleblower payment243 now requires that “the statutory period for [the 
taxpayer] filing a claim for refund expires,”244 which is generally two years 
from payment of the tax,245 or that “there is an agreement between the 
taxpayer and the Service that there has been a final determination of tax for 
a specific period and a waiver of the right for filing a claim for refund is 
effective.”246 
In a typical tax matter, the Service has a limited time to assert a 
taxpayer’s deficiency.247  For taxpayers who file a return timely, the Service 
must assert a deficiency within three years.248  Taxpayers who understate 
gross income by more than 25% are subject to a six-year statute of 
limitations,249 and taxpayers who fail to file a return or file a fraudulent 
return have no statute of limitations for that tax year.250 
Taxpayers are similarly limited in their abilities to apply for a refund.  
Section 6511 limits claims for refunds to the lesser of three years from the 
time that the return is filed or two years from payment.251  Because 
whistleblower payments rely upon collected proceeds, the more relevant 
limit is usually two years from payment.  Previously, the Service interpreted 
collected proceeds to be when payment was collected from the taxpayer.  
The Service now adopts the view that “payment will not be paid until there 
is a final determination of tax liability,”252 and the Service defines final 
determination to include the two-year refund window. 253 
This additional two-year wait disappoints some whistleblower 
advocates, who view the additional time period as unnecessary.254  The 
Service added this time period to achieve finality.  Although the old adage 
                                                
243 See GAO Report, supra note 76 at 8. The eight-step process documented by the 
GAO is: 1. Whistleblower files claim, 2. Whistleblower Office initial claim review, 3. 
Subject matter expert review, 4. Classification and examination, 5. Appeals and collections, 
6. Period for taxpayer to exercise right to request refund. 7. Whistleblower Office final 
review and 8. Award payment.  
244 I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010). 
245 § 6511. 
246 Id. 
247 § 6501 
248 § 6501(a). 
249 § 6501(e)(1). 
250 § 6501(c)(1) and (3). 
251 § 6511(a). 
252 I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010). 
253 Id.  
254 See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 8-10; Sullivan and Rubin Letter, 
supra note 165 at 11. 
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may indicate “that nothing is certain by death and taxes,” finality is actually 
quite hard to achieve for the Service, even when it settles with taxpayers.255  
Last year, the Service’s Appeals Office closed more than 133,000 taxpayer 
matters,256 85-90% of which were likely settled.257  While there are several 
ways in which to settle a dispute with the Service, only one way is 
statutorily recognized as final: closing agreements under § 7121.258  This 
lack of settlement finality has created the need for the Service to wait until 
the two-year refund window closes.   
The Service settles disputes with taxpayers using settlement agreement 
forms (e.g. Forms 870 and 870-AD), closing agreements (e.g. Forms 866 
and 906), and compromise agreements (e.g. Offers in Compromise).259  On 
its face, settlement agreement Form 870 does not achieve finality.  It 
contemplates that, post-payment, the taxpayer could request a refund and 
the Service could make further assessment.260  The Service prefers to use 
this form rather than other forms,261 likely because it allows the Service to 
assert later uncovered deficiencies.  Indeed, the I.R.M. expressly advises 
Service personnel that “[i]f the taxpayer requests greater finality [than Form 
870 provides], explain Service policy with regard to reopenings and make 
an attempt to persuade the taxpayer a Form 870-type agreement is 
adequate.”262   
Form 870-AD offers a somewhat more certain resolution in that the 
form expressly limits recourse for both the Service and the taxpayer by 
stating: 
If this offer is accepted, the case will not be reopened by the 
commissioner unless there was: fraud, malfeasance, or a 
misrepresentation of material fact; a deficiency or 
overassessment resulting from adjustments made under 
Subchapters C and D of Chapter 63 concerning the tax 
                                                
255 See infra text accompanying notes 259-269. 
256 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2010 Data Book, table 21, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=207731,00.html . 
257 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2009 Data Book, table 21, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=207731,00.html (comparing prior years 
information). 
258 § 7121.  
259 See SALTZMAN, supra note 107  
260 See Internal Revenue Serv., Form 870 (reverse side). 
261 See I.R.M. 8.6.4.3.3(1), Agreements Used When Taxpayer Requests Greater 
Finality (10-26-2007) (indicating the policy preference for 870 forms). 
262 Id. 
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treatment of partnership and subchapter S items determined 
at the partnership and corporate level; an excessive tentative 
allowance of a carryback provided by law.  No claim for 
refund or credit will be filed or prosecuted by the taxpayer 
for the years stated on this form, other than for amounts 
attributed to carrybacks provided by law.263 
Although Form 870-AD expresses finality, there are a number of listed 
exceptions that affect finality.264  Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly 
found that this form, “though not biding in itself, may when executed 
become, under some circumstances, binding on the parties by estoppel.”265  
This Supreme Court quote indicates that an 870-AD only achieves finality 
in “some circumstances.”  Consequently, despite Service efforts to persuade 
taxpayers to the contrary,266 common Service settlement agreements (e.g. 
Forms 870 and 870-AD) do not achieve finality.  
Closing agreements, on the other hand, are statutorily deemed final.  
Under § 7121(b) closing agreements “shall be made final and conclusive, 
except upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance or misrepresentation of 
material fact . . .”267  As deemed final under the statute, “even the parties 
themselves may not rescind or cancel”268 a closing agreement in absence of 
fraud, malfeasance or misinterpretation.  However, even though closing 
agreements are statutorily deemed final, collected proceeds may not be fully 
realized under a closing agreement that concludes only certain tax matters 
and not an entire tax year.  For example, Form 906 only contemplates the 
settlement of specific tax matters, not setting the tax liability for a tax year 
(as contemplated by Form 866).  Accordingly, other tax items that are not 
settled under Form 906 could affect the ultimate tax liability, which 
determines collected proceeds.  In other words, a whistleblower could 
provide a tip that results in a taxpayer’s increased income (or decreased 
deduction); then the taxpayer could resolve the income/deduction matter 
under a Form 906 closing agreement but later apply for a refund on the 
basis of other tax matters.  While the closing agreement concluded the tax 
                                                
263 See Internal Revenue Serv., Form 870-AD (reverse side) (emphasis added). 
264 Id. 
265 See SALTZMAN, supra note 107 at 9-79 (quoting Botany Worsted Mills v. U.S., 278 
U.S. 282, 289 (1929)).  
266 See I.R.M. 8.6.4.3.3(1), Agreements Used When Taxpayer Requests Greater 
Finality (10-26-2007) (stating the Service policy to persuade taxpayers of the adequacy of 
870-type forms). 
267 § 7121(b). 
268 See SALTZMAN, supra note 107 at 9-98.  
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matters in question, it did not set the final tax liability for the tax year.  
Until a tax year’s tax liability is set and proceeds are collected (based on 
that liability), there are no collected proceeds to calculate a whistleblower 
award payment.   
The lack of certain finality with tax settlements creates significant 
uncertainty for the Service and whistleblowers when calculating collected 
proceeds.  Consequently, finality must be balanced with administrability so 
that whistleblower cases can be processed and closed, and an appropriate 
incentive level is maintained.  The Service’s position with respect to the 
two-year refund statute of limitations is administrable and a reasonable time 
period to wait to achieve finality for typical matters, matters using 
settlement agreements (e.g. Forms 870 and 870-AD), and closing 
agreements for specific matters (e.g. Form 906).  Closing agreements that 
settle a tax year’s liability and waive refund rights (as Form 866 does) are 
sufficiently final therefore collected proceeds should not be subjected to the 
two-year refund statute when this type of closing agreement is used.  
Even with a Form 866 closing agreement for the tax year, the possibility 
always exists that subsequent events could alter the collected proceeds at a 
later date.  For example, subsequent year carrybacks could create this 
situation.269  This, however, should not affect the proceeds that are collected 
under a Form 866 agreement. Waiting on such a contingency undermines 
the certainty, and consequently the incentive, for a whistleblower.  
Allowing this level of uncertainty would undermine the legislative intent of 
the 2006 amendments to create greater financial incentive for 
whistleblowers with tips providing significant revenue. Only Form 866 
closing agreements should be considered sufficiently final to measure and 
pay collected proceeds once the proceeds are collected from the taxpayer 
because this Form settles the tax liability for the taxpayer.  All other closing 
agreement forms should be subject to the two-year refund statute to 
calculate collected proceeds with certainty. 
F.  Timing Issues 
 
The final issues raised in the comment letters involved timing, both the 
timing of income and deductions for the taxpayer and timing of payments to 
whistleblowers. 
 
                                                
269 See e.g., § 172(b)(1)(A) (allowing for NOL carryback and carryforward).    
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1. Temporary Adjustments 
 
Subsequent events are not only a concern with respect to closing 
agreements, they are a concern for many other types of whistleblower 
claims.  The timing of income and deductions has always been a concern 
for the Service.  Taxpayers have an incentive to defer income recognition 
into subsequent years to delay paying tax, and taxpayers have an incentive 
to accelerate deductions to minimize current taxable income.270 These 
incentives are inherent in the structure of the Code and likely form the basis 
for many whistleblower tips.  These issues typically do not turn on whether 
the income or deduction itself is improper, but instead on the proper timing.  
A whistleblower tip that involves a timing adjustment warrants special 
consideration.   
 
The anonymous taxpayer’s comment letter raised the issue of whether 
“temporary and timing adjustments items that, if adjusted during the exam, 
are expected to reverse in a future year” should be considered collected 
proceeds.271 The taxpayer argues that proceeds on such amounts “should be 
limited to the amount of interest paid by the corporate violator.”272  This 
comment is particularly insightful and makes a valid point.  For a taxpayer 
who inappropriately accelerates a tax benefit but is entitled to claim it at a 
later date, a whistleblower tip exposing the deficiency should not be 
compensated on the value of the tax year change because it will be claimed 
later.  Rather, the whistleblower payment should be made on a basis that 
reflects the revenue protected.  Here, it is the time value of revenue.  
Accordingly, as the anonymous taxpayer points out, the whistleblower 
should be compensated on the time value of money. This scenario raises 
many related questions of timing and finality with respect to collected 
proceeds.   
 
2. Timing of Payment & Future Payments 
 
As explained above, some whistleblower attorneys have proposed 
monetizing tips, which lead to uncollected proceeds, into current payment 
                                                
270 See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934) (“Any one may so 
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that 
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's 
taxes.”). 
271 Letter from Anonymous Taxpayer to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Serv., at 3-4 
(Mar. 23, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-6545.  
272 Id. at 3. 
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using a discount factor.273  These proposals rely on advancing payment for 
not yet collected proceeds.  Advancing payment is contrary to the statutory 
requirement of collection, which contemplates payment in hand.274  
Attempts to monetize uncollected proceeds with present value calculations 
or discount factors defy the statutory requirement of collection.275  While 
this approach is not supported by the language and is unwise, it does 
suggest a broader view of temporal measurement that is discussed in Part 
IV.276   
The outstanding question remaining is when a measurement for an 
award must occur.  There is no statutory guidance or limit.  The current 
Service guidance only indicates that it cannot occur before collection and 
finality have been met.277  There are no limitations for extending the time 
for measurement until collection is made.  This also opens up the issue of 
periodic payments on collected amounts.  These, of course, run contrary to 
ease of administration due to the need for continued and perhaps prolonged 
monitoring, and timely payment.  In certain circumstances, such a plan may 
be the only available option for whistleblower compensation.   
IV.  A BETTER APPROACH FOR COLLECTED PROCEEDS 
 
As discussed in Parts II and III, the Service’s interpretation of collected 
proceeds under § 301.7623-1 and the alternatives proposed by the 
whistleblower advocates fail to fully address the primary attributes of a 
successful Whistleblower Program.278  A successful Whistleblower 
Program should offer sufficient incentives to attract whistleblowers, 
maintain procedures that are administrable, and promote federal revenue 
protection.279  Part IV demonstrates that there is better approach for 
collected proceeds that relies on expanding the time frame to capture the 
additional tax revenues required for collected proceeds.280 
 
                                                
273 See also Sullivan and Rubin Letter, supra note 165 at 7 (advocating use of the 
discount factor). 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 168-175. 
275 See supra text accompanying notes 168-175.  
276 See infra text accompanying notes 302-314.. 
277 See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128 at 1-2 (stating that the “language . . . has the 
legal effect of authorizing the IRS to disburse money that it collects . . .” and further 
discussing the interpretation of collected).  See also I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: 
Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (noting finality required).  
278 See supra text accompanying notes 82-277. 
279 See supra notes 5-7.  
280 See infra text accompanying notes 302-314. 
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The outstanding issues under the current whistleblower program are: (1) 
whether proceeds should be paid prior based on future collection,281 (2) 
whether all criminal fines should be included in collected proceeds,282 (3) 
the inclusion of credit balances and tax attributes in collected proceeds,283 
and (4) timing and finality issues related to measuring collected proceeds.284  
With respect to future collection, criminal proceeds, credit balances and tax 
attributes, the Service has taken a supportable and well-reasoned position.285  
However, if the Service would adopt a longer time horizon for the 
measurement of collected proceeds and award payment, then much of the 
concern over nonpayment for awards resulting in changes to credit balances 
and tax attributes could be ameliorated.  
 
A.  Whistleblower Awards Cannot be Paid Without Collection 
 
There are numerous proposals that fall under this heading.  Proposals 
could be as sweeping as rewarding any credible whistleblower claim with a 
finders’ fee,286 regardless of collection, or using economic modeling to 
predict future proceeds for calculation of award payment.287  Proposals 
could also be as narrow as only expanding collected proceeds to include 
NOL reductions but no other tax attribute items.288  These alternatives are 
appealing because they greatly incentivize whistleblowers to come forward. 
While these alternatives are likely to maximize the number of potential 
whistleblowers to come forward, the practical administration is lacking 
given the Service’s resource constraints.  Broadening the scope of collected 
proceeds could overly burden the Whistleblower Office, generating too 
many claims and diverting attention away from the larger § 7623(b) 
whistleblower claims.289  The processing and payment delays under the 
current Whistleblower Program are already a significant problem,290 and 
these alternatives could exacerbate the current process delays by flooding 
the system with claims.  More importantly, these alternatives are not 
                                                
281 See infra text accompanying notes 286-293. 
282 See infra text accompanying notes 294-298. 
283 See infra text accompanying notes 299-301. 
284 See infra text accompanying notes 302-314. 
285 See infra text accompanying notes 286-301.  
286 See Sullivan and Rubin Letter, supra note 165 at 4 (suggesting reward of exposure 
of all tax fraud).   
287 Id. at 7-8 (suggesting the use of a discount factor to arrive at a present value for 
future evasion). 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 175-207. 
289 See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 5 at 1172. 
290 See supra text accompanying notes 56-80. 
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supported by the current statutory language mandating collection,291 and 
they utterly fail to protect federal revenue.292  These proposals could 
facilitate a tax whistleblower program that pays out more in awards than it 
increases tax revenues, which is certainly contrary to the legislative intent 
of the 2006 amendments.293  A change in the interpretation of “collected” as 
required by statute could increase the incentive to whistleblowers but the 
cost of such a change would be too high from an administration and revenue 
protection standpoint. 
 
B.  Under the Service’s Current Approach, District Court Criminal Fines 
are Appropriately Excluded from Collected Proceeds 
 
If Congress decided its objective was to maximize potential tax 
whistleblower awards by including fines, 42 U.S.C. § 10601 would provide 
an exception to criminal fines in tax whistleblower cases.294   These fines 
could be included in collected proceeds and paid to tax whistleblowers, with 
the balance going to the criminal victims fund.  Given the existence of the 
criminal victims fund statute and as discussed in Subpart III.D., the Service 
has appropriately interpreted § 7623 to give meaning to both statutes in a 
reasonable manner.295  It is evident that the losers here are tax 
whistleblowers whose tips are the catalysts for tax criminal prosecutions 
resulting in criminal fines.   
 
There is a possible exception to create an award for the Whistleblower.  
Prosecuting U.S. attorneys can be cognizant of this statutory landscape and 
request restitution in lieu of criminal fines so as to increase the pool of 
collected proceeds. It is not a perfect solution.  It lacks any degree of 
certainty of payment because it relies on sentencing discretion.  Worse still, 
if the whistleblower’s identity has successfully been kept secret, such a 
request could imply to a defendant the existence of a whistleblower.296  
Perhaps one saving grace is that tax criminal prosecutions require greater 
proof than other tax proceedings297 and are typically reserved for the most 
                                                
291 See supra text accompanying notes 165-174. 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 194-207. 
293 See supra text accompanying notes 165-174. 
294 See supra text accompanying notes 223-238. 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 228-238. 
296 The request itself could imply a whistleblower.  In addition, a prosecutor’s request 
for a restitution in lieu of criminal fine is likely to engender a request for explanation from 
the judge, defense, or both. 
297 See Tax Court Rule 142(b) (noting the burden of proof for civil tax fraud as “clear 
and convincing”).  See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (“. . . we explicitly hold that the 
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egregious cases.  In such cases, proceeds are often had in a variety of forms: 
tax revenue, penalties for fraud, and interest.298  In many cases, the other 
sources of collection will contribute to a significant pool of proceeds to pay 
out the whistleblower. 
 
While a statutory exception would be ideal, the Service cannot just 
ignore the existence of 42 U.S.C. § 10601.  Given the available options 
under the language of statutory language, the Service’s approach to omit 
fines from collected proceeds is appropriate.  
 
C.  Tax Attributes Cannot be Included in Collected Proceeds 
 
As explained in Subpart III.B., reductions in tax attributes alone cannot 
be included in a collected proceeds calculation.299  They must be viewed in 
the broader context of tax liability.  All award payments require collected 
revenues to the Treasury.  Tax attributes may provide collected revenues, 
however there is no way to calculate with certainty the amount of the 
potential revenues that will result from the existence of a tax attribute 
item.300  The whistleblower statute is designed to promote federal revenue 
protection, and this can only occur if award payments are made from 
proceeds that are collected.  However, whistleblower information that 
results in significant tax attribute reduction may ultimately result in 
collected proceeds if the time period for measuring the proceeds is 
extended. In the next Subpart, we discuss an expanded time horizon.301  
  
D.  The Service should take a Broader View of the Time Period for 
Collecting Proceeds 
 
The Service should expand the time horizon for collecting proceeds.  
This alternative is a compromise between the Service’s interpretation302 and 
whistleblower advocates’ proposals, discussed in Parts II and III.303  This 
                                                                                                                       
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.”).  See also I.R.M. 25.1.1.2.2, Requirements of Proof (05-29-1999) (noting the 
differing burdens for tax criminal matters and tax civil matters).  
298 See § 1 (imposing tax on taxable income); § 6601 et seq. (noting interest on tax 
liabilities); § 6651 et seq. (noting penalties on tax liabilities).  
299 See supra text accompanying notes 175-207. 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 175-207. 
301 See supra text accompanying notes 302-314. 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 81-152. 
303 See supra text accompanying notes 153-277. 
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alternative acknowledges that there must be a positive cash increase in tax 
revenues collected in order for a reward payment, but allows additional time 
for the positive cash increase to occur.  There are two possible methods to 
create an additional time frame to calculate collected proceeds.  The first is 
to allow a whistleblower case that results in an adjustment that produces 
uncollected proceeds to remain open until the expiration of any possible 
carryforwards.  For many items this may be only a few years.  For NOLs, 
carryforwards are allowed for twenty years.304  In the case of NOLs, this 
carryforward period is quite lengthy and is administratively unwieldy.  A 
variation of the proposal, similar to a proposal advanced by the anonymous 
taxpayer,305 could offer any whistleblower claim with a potential for 
collected proceeds an additional ten-year window (instead of the full 20-
year carryforward) for the collection of proceeds.  
 
These alternatives will require additional administration costs because 
some cases will not be closed as quickly as under the current interpretation 
of collected proceeds, and additional monitoring will be required for all 
carryforward cases.  To ease the administration of these proposals, the 
proposal should only apply to § 7623(b) claims.  Payment for claims under 
§ 7623(a) are statutorily within the discretion of the Service, and are not the 
claims that Congress or the Service are expecting to raise significant 
revenue.306  Further, all carryforward claims should be evaluated annually. 
The notification to the whistleblower under this proposal is very limited in 
nature.  The need to provide some communication to the whistleblower 
must be weighed against confidentiality concerns.307   
 
Whistleblower claims with carryforwards should be directed into an 
annual review cycle for the remainder of the limitations period or the ten-
year limit, and the whistleblowers should receive notification that their 
claim has been evaluated and directed into the annual review cycle.  One 
negative of the current program is that, after submission of a tip, 
whistleblowers can wait years before receiving any information from the 
Service.308  Much of this silence is undertaken to prevent whistleblower 
                                                
304 § 172(b)(1)(A). 
305 See Anonymous Letter, supra note 271. 
306 Compare §7623(a) and (b) (no minimum case threshold for discretionary payment 
vs. mandatory payment for tips involving amounts in dispute of at least $2 million or 
annual gross income of $200,000.).  
307 See generally Kwon, supra note 35 (discussing confidentiality issues in the IRS 
Whistleblower Program). 
308 See Internal Revenue Serv., What Happens to a Claim for an Informant Award 
(Whistleblower), available at http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0,,id=181290,00.html  
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collaboration from tainting the taxpayer case.309  Once taxpayer liability has 
been determined and the only outstanding issue is whether proceeds will be 
collected in the future, taint is no longer a concern.   Communication at this 
window is appropriate and will prevent a lack of communication between 
the Service and the whistleblower for what could in some cases be decades.  
 
The concern of taint and for disclosure of taxpayer information may still 
be present with the proposed notification.  If the notification contains any 
more information than a statement that the tip is being placed in the annual 
review cycle, then the notification may require that whistleblower execute a 
confidentiality statement that the information contained in this notice and 
the receipt of the notice itself will not be disclosed to any third party with 
the exception of the whistleblower’s legal representative.  The notification 
is not a promise of a future reward but an acknowledgement that the 
submitted claim may be eligible for payment based on the investigation and 
potential future use of the information reported to generate collected 
proceeds.   
 
The time expansion proposal does not violate any statutory prohibition.  
In fact, there is not mention of time for measurement of proceeds.  Only the 
I.R.M. discussed the need for finality with respect to the taxpayer’s case.310  
There is no discussion of time allowed for collection of proceeds.  
Accordingly, no current guidance would have to be changed.  This proposal 
will merely speak in an area on which the Service has been silent.   
 
Admittedly, this proposal does add administrative cost and could 
prolong the process in some ways; however, some of the additional 
administration should be accomplished by computer algorithm to check for 
the collection of additional proceeds that could be eligible for distribution to 
a whistleblower.  A review by Whistleblower Office personnel will be 
required if proceeds are flagged; however, appropriate computer-based 
screening, at which the Service has proven previously adept, should limit 
additional labor costs.   
 
                                                                                                                       
(“The process, from submission of complete information to the Service until the proceeds 
are collected, may take several years.”). 
309 See I.R.M. Exhibit 25.2.2-6, Memorandum from Steven T. Miller (Feb. 17, 2010) 
(“In some cases, contacts between the IRS and an informant may taint information received 
from the informant.”). 
310 See I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (“payment 
will not be paid until there is a final determination of tax liability”). 
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Most importantly, the proposal functions to fulfill the legislative intent 
for a greater incentive.311  Senator Grassley has expressed concern that 
whistleblowers who have come forward with good and valuable tips are not 
paid because the tips may result in tax attribute changes that are not readily 
converted into collected proceeds.312  This proposal takes a broader view of 
the time for collection to allow for the payments when proceeds are 
collected.  It does so, however, without resorting the frequently advanced 
proposal of payout without collection.313  Such proposals do not protect 
federal revenue and could facilitate a program that spends far more on 
whistleblowers than it takes in.   
 
This proposal certainly contemplates that the Service would make partial or 
periodic payments as proceeds are collected.  This should not be unusual.  It 
was contemplated in the 1999 I.R.M., which provided that the 
whistleblower “Claims Examiner should periodically review the account to 
determine whether additional collections have been made which would 
justify an additional reward to the informant.”314  The proposal to increase 
the length of the time to calculate the collected proceeds will continue to 
protect federal revenues, create a greater incentive to whistleblowers and 
create reasonable additional administration requirements.  This proposal 
provides a workable solution to the collected proceeds that is currently 
lacking in the Service’s interpretation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Service’s whistleblower program has undergone significant revision 
in the last six years.315  These revisions have drastically improved the 
incentives to attract whistleblowers and the Service’s administration of the 
program, while continuing to promote federal revenue protection.  Despite 
these improvements, additional work is needed to address several 
deficiencies.  The deficiency in greatest need of correction is what 
constitutes collected proceeds under the whistleblower statute.316 Under 
current guidance, the term “collected proceeds” remains vague and 
                                                
311 Compare §7623(a) and (b) (no minimum case threshold for discretionary payment 
vs. mandatory payment for tips involving amounts in dispute of at least $2 million or 
annual gross income of $200,000.). 
312 See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 7. 
313 See supra text accompanying notes 165-174. 
314 I.R.M. 25.2.2.15(1)(b), Assessed Deficiencies Determined Uncollectible (04-27-
1999). 
315 See supra text accompanying notes 45-55, 112-146. 
316 See supra text accompanying notes 81-277. 
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ambiguous despite the Service’s attempts at clarification. Additional 
guidance is necessary to promote greater certainty for award payments.  
This certainty is critical to attracting potential whistleblowers to come 
forward, and, if appropriately structured and administered, should decrease 
award payout delays. 
  
 As discussed in Part IV, the collected proceeds term should be 
clarified.317  The changes to the Regulation are a step in the right 
direction,318 but stop far short of offering a comprehensive reading of 
collected proceeds.  The alternatives proposed by the whistleblower 
advocates have the opposite problem of being overly inclusive.319  Our 
proposed solution attempts to find a reasonable middle-ground that provides 
sufficient incentive to attract whistleblowers to come forward while 
maintaining administrability and federal revenue protection.  This solution 
upholds the Service current (non-conflicting) guidance on collected 
proceeds but expands the timeframe for payout of tax attribute items 
including net operating losses.   
 
 For any valid whistleblower tip that results in a tax attribute adjustment 
but not collected proceeds, the proposed solution extends the time for 
collecting proceeds to either the full window for taxpayer usage of the tax 
attribute, or, in the alternative, a ten-year window for easier administrative 
purposes.  Opening a ten-year window for claims that do not generate 
additional tax revenues in the return year solves an inherent problem to the 
current definition of collected proceeds that focuses exclusively on the tax 
return year or years reported by the whistleblower and ignores the potential 
value of tax attributes.  This ten-year window further acknowledges that 
many whistleblower claims may involve tax revenue recoveries that extend 
beyond the tax year or years reported by the whistleblower. 
 
 In order for this proposal to succeed the Service must be willing to use 
partial payouts of awards and implement additional resources into 
monitoring and tracking claims throughout the entire ten-year payout 
window.  While there are some additional costs to the Whistleblower Office 
under the proposal, the added certainty and potential for award payouts not 
present under the current system should maintain the level of tips already 
attracted and perhaps attract new whistleblower tips.  This new system 
                                                
317 See supra text accompanying notes 278-314.  
318 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1.  See also supra text accompanying notes 81-
152. 
319 See supra text accompanying notes 153-277.   
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would appeal to whistleblowers who have a valid tip but are concerned that 
there is no current basis for a payout of an award.  By submitting their claim 
now, the whistleblower is essentially setting a lien on future tax revenues 
that result from the information turned into the Whistleblower Program and 
no longer has to weigh the risk of having another whistleblower come 
forward with the same information or potentially have the taxpayer amend 
and correct the erroneous return independently from the IRS. 
 
 Implementing an interpretation of collected proceeds that enables 
whistleblowers to predict potential award payouts with greater certainty 
provides greater incentive to the whistleblower to come forward.  An 
effective incentive for whistleblowers is the crux to an effective 
Whistleblower Program.  The definition of collected proceeds must be 
reevaluated and expanded to ensure that a proper incentive is offered to 
attract whistleblowers to step forward and blow the whistle.     
